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A 23-year old mother of three must find a new home. In a cou~ple
of days the police will come to her house with hammers and plywood
to nail boards over the windows and doors of her home. Wondering
how this could happen, she enlists the help of her lender. Eventually
they learn that shortly after the mother purchased the home, a court
entered an order under the public nuisance abatement statute directing
the prior owner to close the house because of drug-related activity.
Neither the mother, nor her lender, were parties to the public nuisance
action. Neither received notice that public nuisance proceedings were
pending even though the mother lived in the home during the entire
course of the abatement action and the lender's interest in the property
was duly recorded. Although the mother eventually secured legal assis-
tance after learning of the court's order, her attorneys soon learned
that the public nuisance statute offered their client few options.'
Law enforcement agencies increasingly use public nuisance law,
much as they use civil forfeiture law, to aid in battling the War on
Drugs. This Article examines the application of public nuisance law to
control unlawful activities conducted within a person's home. An order
abating a public nuisance may not only prevent owners and occupants
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from using their homes for prohibited purposes, but also may prevent
the use of the home for any purpose. Indeed, an order of abatement
may direct permanent seizure of a home without compensation to its
owner or other occupants. A recent Supreme Court case, Bennis v.
Michigan,2 suggests that such a result may be permissible despite recent
major developments in constitutional property law under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments limiting the ability of states to impair private
property rights without compensation. Permanent seizure of a home as
a remedy for public nuisance conduct may also occur despite the high
level of protection the Constitution provides the home and interests
associated with it under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Article suggests an approach courts should use when consider-
ing whether to abate a public nuisance within a home that is consistent
with the goals and purposes of traditional public nuisance law as well
as modem approaches to the regulation of individual rights and proper-
ty. Part I provides the background for the analysis as it examines the
common law origins of public nuisance law and the expansion of the
equitable remedy of abatement. It also contrasts the law of public
nuisance with the law of civil forfeiture. Although the law of civil
forfeiture also permits uncompensated seizure of property connected to
unlawful conduct, it often provides important procedural and substantive
protections that public nuisance law does not.3 Part II examines the
constitutional rules that protect the home and individual rights related to
it from government intrusion under the Fourth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part I considers the
home as property and the protection the Constitution provides private
property rights. It also examines the role of public nuisance law in the
Court's takings analysis, which now largely rejects the broad exercise
of police power that has justified much of public nuisance law. Part
IV examines Bennis v. Michigan,4 the 1996 public nuisance case in
which the Supreme Court failed to apply the takings analysis it outlined
only a few years earlier in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.'
Bennis has been criticized for, among other things, its treatment of
innocent family members in the context of criminal law and contempo-
rary notions of the rights of married women.' This Article criticizes
2. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
3. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. II 1996) (excluding from forfeiture real property
used "without the knowledge or consent" of that owner).
4. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
5. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family as an Innocent Victim of Civil
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the Court's analysis of Michigan's public nuisance statute in light of
recent cases analyzing claims of statutory impairment of individual and
economic rights. Finally, Part V suggests an approach for reconcilifig
the public power expressed in public nuisance law with the importance
of private rights embodied in the home. It urges courts to consider the
abatement of public nuisances with the same critical, case-by-case anal-
ysis of state power that they must apply to takings and due process law
challenges in land-use and other areas. Application of public nuisance
law in this manner acknowledges its historical and common law roots
as an equitable tool used by the state to further public policy goals. It
also promotes greater consistency in the application of takings and due
process doctrine.
I. THE LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
A. Historical Background of Public Nuisance Law
The law of public nuisance has characteristics that are both punitive
and remedial. Although these qualities may conflict, they contribute to
a body of law that, from its English beginnings, has changed as the
needs of the public have changed.
1. English Origins
a. Nuisance Conduct: Criminal Interference with Public Rights
The law of public nuisance originated in the English law of "com-
mon" or public nuisance,7 which included an assortment of petty crimi-
nal offenses involving public rights of ways-such as waterways and
roads-or "noisome trades."'  These offenses were entirely distinct from
conduct included in the tort law of private nuisance, which protects the
Drug Asset Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L REv. 343 (1996); Amy D. Ronner, Husband and Wife Are
One-Him: Bennis v. Michigan as the Resurrection of Coverture, 4 MICIL J. GENDER & L 129
(1996).
7. See J. R. Spencer, Public Nuisance-A Critical Eraminatlon, 48 CAmRDGE Li. 55, 58
& n.10 (1989) (noting that despite some effort to define the terms "common nuisance" and
"public nuisance" distinctly, they are generally used interchangeably).
8. See W. PAGE KEEmON Er AL., PROSSER & KEErON ON THE LAW OF TOxRS 643.44 (5th ed.
1984); Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Lma of Public Nuisance: A Com-
parison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years Afier Boomer, 54 ALB. L REV. 359 (1990); Louise
A. Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plainilffs: Rediscovering the Common Law (Part 1), 16
ENVrL L. REP. 10292 (1986); Spencer, supra note 7, at 59.
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use and enjoyment of land.9
Over time, conduct prosecuted as a common nuisance was not lim-
ited to interferences with public rights of way, but included interferenc-
es with public rights in general. Thus defendants could be prosecuted
for allowing infirm animals to wander, selling unwholesome food and
drink, washing hemp or flax in water used for cattle, fishing or hunting
out of season, operating "lewd ale-houses," even subdividing houses to
prevent them from becoming "hurtful to the place by overpestring it
with poor."'"
William Hawkins is credited as the first to assign a definition to
the term "common nuisance" in the early eighteenth century.' In A
Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown,2 Hawkins grouped an assortment of
minor offenses such as damaging a public highway, failing to repair a
bridge, "running a bawdy-house," and operating a "gaming house" un-
der the title "common nuisance" which he defined as: "an Offence
against the Publick, either by doing a Thing which tends to the Annoy-
ance of all the King's Subjects, or by neglecting to do a Thing which
the common Good requires."'3 Blackstone included Hawkins' definition
in his Commentaries to describe a category of "Offences against the
public health, and the public polic[y]" '14 and identified seven types of
9. See Spencer, supra note 7, at 59; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) &
cmt. a (1977); Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28
IND. L. REv. 329 (1995) (asserting that confusion between public and private nuisance contrib-
utes to "takings muddle"); Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance
Injunctions-Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 639 & n.97 (1976)
(same); Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 775, 778-85 (1986) (highlighting basic distinctions between public nuisance and private
nuisance tort); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A (1977); KEErON ET AL., supra
note 8, § 90, at 643.
As early as the thirteenth century, English legal scholars noted that the civil tort of pri-
vate nuisance was unlike "nuisances which sheriffs are authorised to redress ...as is the case
of a way being stopped." Spencer, supra note 7, at 58 & n.7 (quoting Britton, lib. 11, ch.
XXX, cap. 8). By 1535, English courts appeared to recognize that a defendant who had
"stopped the King's highway" had committed a "common" or public nuisance, a criminal of-
fense punished in the criminal courts, which had jurisdiction over the highways and could fine
or otherwise punish persons who dumped garbage and waste in them, thus causing them to
flood. See, e.g., Anon, Y.B., Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f.27, pl. 10 (1535), reprinted In RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 603 (5th ed. 1990) [hereinafter Anon].
10. Spencer, supra note 7, at 60 & n.15 (citing William Sheppard). J. R. Spencer clarifies
the courts' use of public nuisance law to avoid overcrowding "because they thought the impov-
erished inhabitants would catch the plague, not because they thought they were one." Id.
11. Id at 65.
12. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN (Garland Pub., Inc. facsimile
reprint 1978) (1721).
13. Spencer, supra note 7, at 65-66 (1989); HAWKINS, supra note 12, at 197.
14. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs *161, 167 (defining common nuisance as "either
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common nuisances: interfering with public highways, bridges and rivers,
including building on real property owned by the crown; maintaining
disorderly places; operating unlicensed lotteries; making, selling or
using fireworks; eavesdropping; and being a "common scold."5
b. Remedies Available to the Sovereign: From the Criminal Courts
to the Equity Courts
Until the mid-eighteenth century, the sovereign's only remedy for a
public nuisance was to prosecute in criminal court, which historically
would not grant injunctions to the crown except in cases involving the
unauthorized building on land belonging to the king." However, crimi-
nal prosecution soon proved ineffective against public nuisance conduct
such as the improper disposal of sewage contaminating urban drinking
supplies. 7 Neither a fine nor a jail sentence could alleviate the threat
such conduct had on public health. Moreover, criminal prosecution of
responsible corporations was almost impossible because corporations
were generally immune from criminal liability." As a result, public
officials were left without meaningful means to enforce the public nui-
sance law. In time, the chancery courts responded to the situation and
began to issue permanent injunctions upon application by a state offi-
cial. 9
the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all the king's subjects, or the neglecting to do a
thing which the common good requires").
15. At at *168-69. A scold was a term used to describe "a troublesome and angry person
who, by brawling and wrangling among his or her neighbors, breaks the public peacc, increases
discord, and becomes a public nuisance to the neighborhood" BLACK'S LAW DIcnO.IARY 1346
(6th ed. 1990).
16. Compare Baines v. Baker, 27 Eng. Rep. 105, 107 (1752) (injunction issued to stay
building inoculation hospital in cold bath fields), Uith Attomcy-General v. Richards, 145 Eng.
Rep. 980 (1794) (issuing injunction to abate). See Spencer, supra note 7, at 68. This inter-
ference with royal property was known as a "purprcsture," which Blackstone considered to be a
type of common nuisance similar to an interference with a public right of way. See
BLACKSTo,7 supra note 14, at *167. Where a purprestire existed, the Crown could choose be-
tween alternative remedies: criminal prosecution or collection of rents or court.ordered removal
by abatement. See Attorney General v. Richards, 145 Eng. Rep. 980, 984 (1795) (determining
that property on which buildings existed was "property of the Crown" and ordering that "build-
ings be abated"); Spencer, supra note 7, at 68.
17. See Spencer, supra note 7, at 71.
18. See id. at 70-72.
19. The chancery courts' willingness to award equitable relief to the sovereign may have
resulted from the ability of a private plaintiff to obtain an injunction from the equity courts to
abate the defendant's conduct pending the outcome of the legal proceedings. See KEErON ET AL,
supra note 8, § 90, at 643; Spencer, supra note 7, at 66 & nA6 (citing Babte, 27 Eng. Rep.
at 105). See also Abrams & Washington, supra note 8, at 379-82. Although private parties
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Lawmakers also responded. They enacted comprehensive regulatory
schemes designed to protect the public health and safety and expressly
authorized public officials to seek abatement to enforce them. An
example is the Sanitary Act of 1866," which shifted emphasis away
from the prosecution of persons responsible for creating health and
safety risks toward elimination and prevention of the risks themselves.2
The Sanitary Act allowed the prosecutor to seek abatement of the nui-
sance as a corrective measure instead of criminal penalties." As a
result, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the chancery courts'
power to order public nuisance defendants to abate the conditions they
created was well-established. By the end of the century, the permanent
injunction almost completely replaced the criminal prosecution as a
remedy for public nuisance conduct in England.
2. American Contributions to Public Nuisance Law and the
Equitable Remedy of Abatement
The principles that Hawkins first articulated regarding acts or omis-
sions harmful to the public, and the language describing them, formed
the basis of the modem American public nuisance law.23 By the end
were generally without standing to sue on a public nuisance, a private plaintiff suffering "spe-
cial damages" was an early exception. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 90, at 646. This
private right of action for a public nuisance is traced to a 1535 case in which the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant had obstructed a public highway depriving the plaintiff access from
his house to a "close" on the highway. See Anon, supra note 9, at 603. Chief Justice
Baldwin stated the general rule that the obstruction could not be the basis of a private suit;
rather, it was a "common nuisance" punishable only in the criminal courts. See Id. However,
Judge Fitzherbert believed otherwise: "he who has suffered such greater displeasure [than the
generality have] can have an action to recover the damage which he has by reason of this
special hurt." Id.; see also id. at 604; Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nui-
sance: Past, Present and Future, 54 ALB. L. REv. 189, 195 & n.28 (1990).
20. Sanitary Act, 1866, 29-30 Vict., ch: 90 (Eng.).
21. See id. § 22-23. The Act authorized a Nuisance Authority upon certification of medical
personnel, to notify property owners to "cleanse and disinfect" premises and contents to elimi-
nate and prevent infectious or contagious diseases. Although the Act imposed a penalty upon
persons who failed to comply, it also exempted owners unable to pay for the fines and clean-
up charges and provided alternative methods for disinfection at no cost to the owners. See kd
§ 22-23; see also Spencer, supra note 7, at 76.
22. See Sanitary Act, 1866, 29-30 ViCt., eh. 90, § 22 (Eng.). It also authorized local police
to institute proceedings for the removal of nuisances "[p]rovided always, that no Officer of
Police shall be at liberty to enter any House or Part of a House used as the Dwelling of any
Person without such Person's Consent, or without the Warrant of a Justice of the Peace." Id.
§ 16.
23. Indeed, California is one of several states which have defined nuisance in terms as
broad as those used by Hawkins:
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to the illegal sale of
(Vol. 31:547
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of the nineteenth century, however, American courts had made an im-
portant addition to the development of public nuisance law: the notion
that once something is "characterized as a 'nuisance,' . . . there is
nothing more to be said."24  This feature of public nuisance law sur-
faced as early as 1785 in a Pennsylvania criminal case, in which the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the utility of the public
nuisance conduct could serve as a defense to it.' As public nuisance
law moved out of the criminal courts, the uncompromising notion that
"there is nothing more to be said" followed. It re-emerged with the
expansion of the equitable remedy of abatement at the end of the nine-
teenth century and will be discussed more fully below.2 Prior to that
time, however, the law of public nuisance and the remedies it provided
closely tracked those available in England.
a. Courts and legislatures permit states to seek abatement to
protect health and safety and to promote morality
By the early nineteenth century, American equity courts-like their
English counterparts-acknowledged that public officials could obtain
controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to
the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner,
of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park,
square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.
CAL. CMV. CODE § 3479 (West 1997). See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-8-1 (Michie 1978); N.D. CENr.
CODE § 42-01-01 (1997); see also IND. CODE § 34-1-52-1 (1997); IOwA CODE § 657.1 (1997);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-30-101 (1997); RESTATEENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. a (1977)
(quoting JAmEs FrzAIES STEPHEt4 A GENEAL VIEW OF THE CRIMUNAL LAW OF ENGLAYD 105 (Lon-
don, MacMillan 2d ed. 1890) defining a public nuisance as "an act or omission which obstructs
or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her
Majesty's subjects"); KEErON Er AL, supra note 8, § 86, at 616-17 (using same definition); see
also BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 961 (6th ed. 1990) ("maintaining a public nuisance is by act, or
by failure to perform a legal duty, intentionally causing or permitting a condition to exist
which injures or endangers the public health, safety or welfare").
24. In Prosser and Keeton's treatise on torts, the authors describe nuisance law as follos:
Few terms have afforded so excellent an illustration of the familiar tendency of the
courts to seize upon a catchword as a substitute for any analysis of a problem; the
defendant's interference with the plaintiff's interests is characterized as a "nuisance,"
and there is nothing more to be said.
KEETN ET AL., supra note 8, § 86, at 616-17.
25. See Respublica v. Caldwell, I U.S. 150 (1785). In Caldwell, the defendant was con-
victed for committing a nuisance by erecting a wharf on public property, an offense long con-
sidered to be within the scope of public nuisance law. The Court rejected defense evidence
that the wharf had benefitted the public, and should not be regarded as a nuisance, and af-
firmed the conviction. See it
26. See infra Part I.C.
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abatement of a public nuisance in a court of equity.27  By the middle
of the century, public nuisance law was widely used to regulate public
health and safety, and statutes authorizing abatement were common,
particularly in cases of perceived dangers to public health.28 New
York's 1881 statute was typical, favoring detection and correction of
potential health risks over criminal prosecution. 29  It established a met-
ropolitan sanitary police company and authorized it to investigate "all
ferry-boats, manufactories, slaughter-houses, tenements, houses, hotels
and boarding-houses and edifices suspected of, and charged with being
unsafe, and to take all necessary legal measures for promoting the pub-
lic peace, security of life or health .... ."' After complaint and sum-
mary hearing, a magistrate could order the business to cease operations
and close until the condition was removed.3 In the event the person
responsible did not comply, the "captains of the sanitary company"
could cause the condition to be abated at the owner's expense.32 These
general principles remain in place today in New York and elsewhere,33
as public nuisance law remains important to local governments for
27. Courts provided equitable relief to private plaintiffs complaining of special damages and
granted their requests for abatement of the public nuisance. See, e.g., Coming v. Lowerre, 6
Johns, Ch. 439 (N.Y. Ch. 1822). In 1838, on the authority of an 1814 New York case, the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that in "rare" cases the Attorney General could also
seek abatement of a public nuisance in a court of equity. See City of Georgetown v. Alcxan-
dria Canal Co., 37 U.S. 91 (1838). The Court relied on Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2
Johns. Ch. 371 (N.Y. Ch. 1814), in which the New York court rejected the attorney general's
request for an injunction to prevent unlawful banking practices as a public nuisance on the
facts of the case, but cited purpresture case as authorizing injunctions in limited circumstances.
28. Compare HENRY LACEY McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (2d
ed. 1948), with 1815 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 893, § 1 (declaring "ponds of stagnant watcer" and
"slaughterhouses," among other things, to be "nuisances, productive of offensive vapours and
noxious exhalations, the causes of disease, and ought to be restrained, regulated and removed"),
One of the earliest such statutes, enacted in North Carolina in 1815, declared that "ponds of
stagnant water," "cellars ...whose bottoms contain stagnant and putrid water" and "slaughter
houses" to be common nuisances and authorized local authorities to remove the conditions at
the expense of the property owner if he did not do so himself. 1815 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 10;
compare Sanitary Act, 1866, 29-30 Vict., ch. 90, § 22 (authorizing Nuisance Authority to take
steps for ensuring proper disinfecting and "cleansing" of areas determined to be a public nui-
sance).
29. See 1881 N.Y. PENAL CODE § 388.
30. 1864 N.Y. GEN. STAT. ch. 403, § 52.
31. See id.
32. Id. at §§ 53, 54.
33. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw ch. 44, §§ 1301-1330 (McKinney 1997); see also MD.
CODE ANN. ENVIR. §§ 10-101 to -305 (1997) (creating local boards of health with broad anti-
nuisance powers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 37311-37340 (West 1998) (authorizing third-class
cities to create local boards of health with jurisdiction over public health nuisances).
[Vol. 31:547
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maintaining sanitation and health standards and avoiding fire, health,
and safety hazards.34
The public's physical well-being was not the only target of public
nuisance legislation. Nineteenth century legislatures also enacted public
nuisance statutes to promote contemporary conceptions of morality.35 A
provision in place in Florida prior to statehood authorized courts to
order the abatement of "any nuisance which tends to the immediate
annoyance of the citizens in general, or is manifestly injurious to the
public health and safety or "tends greatly to corrupt the manners and
morals of the people."'36 Likewise, California's public nuisance statute
of 1876 included a general definition of conduct that "offends decen-
cy."3  It provided alternative remedies: criminal indictment, a civil ac-
tion or abatement by a public official. 8 Some states expressly defined
public nuisances in a manner that suggests the early criminal offenses
identified by Hawkins and Blackstone39 and included "immoral" activi-
ties such as prostitution,4" illegal alcohol sales,4 ' and gambling,4 and
made provisions for the abatement of nuisance conduct.
b. Early Distinction Between Abatement and Confiscation
Although remedies for public nuisance conduct may have varied
34. See, e.g., Schneider v. County of San Diego, 28 F.3d 89 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming
interpretation of public nuisance provision of municipal building code); Wendt v. County of
Yakima, No. CY-92-3037, 1993 WL 29160, at *10 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 1993) (dismissing §
1983 claim against county for conduct in enforcing local provisions of uniform code); Mackey
v. City of Cleveland, Nos. 66912, 66929, 1995 WL 143824, at $3 (Ohio App. Ct. Mar. 30,
1995) (holding city entitled to summary judgment that demolition of home under city building
code did not amount to taking without compensation).
35. See Kurtz, supra note 9, at 652. Professor Kurtz credits the grwth of legislative output
from 1871 to 1916 for producing public nuisance provisions directed at "moral vice, such as
drinking, gambling, and bawdy houses," as well as public health and land-use issues such as
slaughter houses and hospitals for the contagiously ill. Id.
36. Pub. Act of Fla. Terr. Legis. Counc. of Feb. 7, 1831, § 47 (emphasis added).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3494 (West 1876); see also 1890 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 56, § 8; 1881
LAws IND. § 289.
38. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3494 (providing that "a public nuisance may be abated by any
public body or officer authorized thereto by law"). Similar language appeared in public nui-
sance statutes of other western states which, like California, provided for equitable abatement as
an alternative to prosecution. See also 1890 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 56, § 8; 1877 ND. Laws §
2054 (now codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-07 (1997)); 1887 S.D. Laws § 2054-2055,
2059 (now codified as revised S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-10-5 (West 1997)); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-10-806 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.200 (1997).
39. See source cited supra note 12 and accompanying texL
40. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REh. CODE ANN. § 125.021(2)-(3) (West 1997).
41. See id; KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 35, § 7 (1868).
42. See id; MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 405, § 1 (1855).
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from state to state, at least until the end of the nineteenth century,
"abatement" was not synonymous with "confiscation" or "destruction"
without compensation. This was true regardless of whether abatement
occurred pursuant to the so-called morality statutes or pursuant to
health and safety provisions. In Ely v. Supervisors of Niagara Coun-
ty,43 a New York appellate court affirmed an award of $4,500 to Maria
Moody, for houses she "kept and maintained" as "bawdy houses, ' 4 in
Niagara City. The houses were destroyed during an 1865 riot and Ms.
Moody sought damages under a statute which provided property owners
with compensation for property destroyed under such circumstances.
The county appealed the award on the ground that by operating the
bawdy house, Ms. Moody "stir[red] up the virtuous indignation of con-
tiguous society' '4 and therefore contributed to the actions of the mob.
The court rejected the argument and stated:
A house kept as a house of ill fame and as a resort for thieves
and other disreputable persons, is a public and common nui-
sance; but the destruction of the building and its furniture is not
necessary to its abatement, and is unlawful; so, too, are riots
and mobs.4
Thus, even where an abatable nuisance may have existed, courts gener-
ally recognized and gave meaning to the property rights associated with
it by compensating owners for losses suffered as a result of public or
private conduct.47
However, when public nuisance conduct could not be controlled
without destruction of goods or property connected to it, courts did not
generally require compensation. Instead, they analyzed a state's de-
struction of property in the same manner as they would analyze a tort
case in which a private party destroyed another's property out of neces-
sity to prevent a greater harm to the public. 48  Because the right of
43. 36 N.Y. 297 (1867).
44. Id. at 299.
45. Id. at 300.
46. Id.
47. See also Lawrence v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 27 N.E. 765 (1891) (affirming award of
$2,150 to lessor for loss of rents caused by construction of elevated railway despite evidence
that tenants used house for "disreputable purposes").
48. See, e.g., American Print Works v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 248, 257 (N.J. 1847). In Law.
rence the court rejected plaintiff's claim that a city's order to destroy his property to prevent
"conflagration" was taking for public use requiring compensation. Instead, the court held that




public necessity49 would relieve a private defendant from liability for
damages, courts reasoned that the state should be relieved from the
obligation to pay compensation. 0 For example, if a statute defined a
public nuisance to include the sale of contaminated meat or produce, a
court could order the goods destroyed without compensation to the
owner.5 Like a private plaintiff who destroyed another's property out
of a public necessity without liability for the value of the property to
avoid a public disaster,52 the sovereign could also destroy the meat to
prevent the spread of disease without compensation to its owner.
5 3
While such cases constituted exceptions, as the substantive scope of
public nuisance law and the application of the equitable abatement
remedy grew, the exceptions began to swallow the rule.
B. Mugler v. Kansas: Crossing the Line Between Abatement
and Confiscation
Distinctions between abatement and destruction all but vanished as
courts increasingly relied on the police power, not the right of public
necessity, as the source of legislative power to control public nuisanc-
es.54 Signaling this shift was the Supreme Court's 1887 decision in
Mugler v. Kansas55 in which the Court affirmed criminal convictions
under the state's prohibition laws as well as civil public nuisance abate-
ment orders seizing certain personal property and closing "the group of
buildings ...constituting the brewery" for a year.56 The defendants
argued that implementation of the orders by closing the breweries and
49. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 8, § 24, at 146-47.
50. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (affirming summary seizure of unlaw-
ful fishing nets without compensation); Hart & Hoyt v. Mayor of Albany, 9 Wend. 571 (N.Y.
1832) (refusing to award money damages for defendant's destruction of unsafe rooming houses);
Seavey v. Preble, 64 Me. 120 (1874) (reversing award of damages resulting from the city phy-
sician's removal of wallpaper from rooms in which small pox patients were confined).
51. But cf. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *62; Lawton, 152 U.S. at 136 (refer-
ring to state's ability to destroy contaminated food at common law).
52. Tort law describes such circumstances as giving rise to a "public necessity." See
KEEToN ET AL, supra note 8, § 24, at 146.
53. A recent example can be found in Empire Kosher Poulry, Ina v. Hallowell, 816 F.2d
907 (3d Cir. 1987), in which the court rejected a takings challenge after the state's quarantine
of poultry to prevent spread of disease greatly diminished poultry's value to owner.
54. Cf. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (affirming destruction of ornamental cedar
trees under public nuisance statute to prevent spread of disease as valid exercise of police pow-
er without regard to whether the property owner's conduct amounted to a public nuisance).
55. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
56. Id at 654.
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seizing their contents would render the property of "no value as prop-
erty, or, at least . materially diminished in value." As a result, they
argued, the orders amounted to a taking of property for public use
without compensation, and a deprivation of their property without due
process of law.1
7
In a famous opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court acknowledged that
enforcement of the abatement orders "materially diminished" the value
of defendants' property." It concluded, however, that the exercise of
the police power to declare certain uses of property harmful to the
health, morals, or safety of the community-not the tort defense of
necessity-provided the basis for uncompensated regulation. Moreover,
it held, such power "cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or
an appropriation of property for the public benefit."59
The Court also distinguished between a state's power to physically
appropriate property through the exercise of eminent domain and its
police power to abate a public nuisance. It reasoned that the power
exercised, not its effect on the individual, triggered the duty to pay
compensation.6" Because implementation of "the police powers of the
State,"' required not only a determination of the public interest, but
also a determination of the best way to protect that interest, any dimin-
ished value resulting from protection of that interest through abatement
of a public nuisance need not be compensated. Moreover, Justice
Harlan suggested that such diminished value was consistent with the
purposes of abatement, "unless it is apparent that its real object is not
to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being, but,
under the guise of police regulation to deprive the owner of his liberty
and property without due process of law.'6 2 He added:
57. Id. at 664.
58. Id. at 667.
59. Id. at 668 (emphasis added). The Court continued: "[S]uch legislation does not disturb
the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the state that its use by any one, for certain forbid-
den purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests." Id. at 669.
60. See id.
61. Id
62. Id. On this point, Justice Field dissented. He maintained that even if the legislation
declaring a nuisance was a valid exercise of the police power, legislation requiring destruction
of property was not. See id. at 678 (Field, J., dissenting). Rather, he wrote, it was up to the
courts and not the legislature to exercise their equitable powers to fashion an order of abate-
ment to protect the public from harm caused by the nuisance conduct. The issue was one of
fairness that required fashioning a remedy to stop the conduct without inflicting "wanton or
unnecessary injury . .. to the property or rights of individuals." Id.
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The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property
which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in
a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is
very different from taking property for public use, or from
depriving a person of his property without due process of law.
In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unof-
fending property is taken away from an innocent owner.
By analogizing the "destruction of property" with the "prohibition
of its use," Justice Harlan effectively equated the two.' Mugler's dis-
tinction between the power of eminent domain to physically appropriate
property and the police power to regulate it extended far beyond the
limited area of public nuisance. It also influenced courts as they con-
sidered a variety of comprehensive regulatory schemes designed to
promote the public interest and their effect on private property rights.
Part I of this Article will consider the Court's examination of
states' general regulatory conduct in more detail in connection with its
discussion of regulatory takings law under the Fifth Amendment. The
remainder of this Part will examine the aftermath of Mugler in the
expansion of public nuisance law.
C. The Aftermath of Mugler: Enlargement of Scope and Remedies
Within a few years after Mugler, and continuing to the present,
legislatures began to enlarge the scope of public nuisance law relatively
free from judicial scrutiny.65 Today, legislatures define public nuisance
to include such things as "cruising, ' maintaining a usurious small loan
business,67 failing to immunize cattle,"8 distributing pornography,"9 and
63. Id at 668-69.
64. In his dissent, Justice Field described the Kansas legislation approved by the majority as
having "passed beyond that verge, and crossed the line which separates regulation from confis-
cation." Id at 678 (Field, J., dissenting).
65. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (rejecting constitutional challenge to New
York public nuisance statute authorizing summary destruction of unlawful fishing nets).
66. See Scheunemann v. City of West Bend 507 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (up-
holding statutory definition of "cruising," i.e., "repetitive, unnecessary driving of automobiles" as
nuisance).
67. See, e.g., State v. Hooker, 87 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1957) (usurious small loan as busi-
ness); see also State v. J.C. Penney Co., 179 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 1970) (usurious charges on
revolving credit line).
68. See People v. Anderson, 189 N.E. 338 (Il. 1934) (failure to immunize cattle).
69. See Fehlhaber v. North Carolina, 675 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1982) (hardcore pornography).
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bull-fighting. ° In Ohio, the public nuisance statute contains seven
separate categories of public nuisance conduct.' In Arizona the num-
ber is twenty.' Moreover, even in states where the legislative defini-
tion of a nuisance is quite broad-as, for example, in Alabama where a
nuisance is defined as "anything that works hurt, damage, or inconve-
nience to another"73-- courts routinely give public officials great leeway
to adapt public nuisance statutes to address contemporary areas of con-
cern, such as the environment,7' pornography,75 and gang-related crimi-
nal activity.76
Legislatures also expanded the scope of the abatement remedy
available to control public nuisances.7 Although treated as an equitable
action, legislative language leaves courts little room to fashion individu-
al relief on a case by case basis.7" For example, in Texas, the public
nuisance statute specifies that in the event a nuisance is found "[t]he
judgment must order that the place where the nuisance exists be closed
for one year after the date of judgment."79  While such an order may
be avoided by posting a bond,"0 absent the resources necessary to post
70. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 125.021 (West 1998).
71. See OntO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767 (Baldwin 1997).
72. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601 (West 1997).
73. ALA. CODE § 6-5-120 (1996).
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974) (holding
common law of public nuisance available to state to compel abatement of acid drainage from
closed mine); see also Abrams & Washington, supra note 8, at 294 (describing nuisance abate-
ment as a "useful weapon in the arsenal against environmental degradation" as in the New
York Love Canal litigation); see generally Halper, supra note 8 (reviewing historical and con-
temporary use of public nuisance for environmental control).
75. See, e.g., Fehlhaber v. North Carolina, 675 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1981) (public nuisance
statute authorizing abatement of "adult" bookstores and theaters); City of Minot v. Central Ave,
News, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1981) (approving city's use of public nuisance abatement
statute to regulate adult entertainment center).
76. People v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 613-14 (Cal. 1997) (affirming use of general public
nuisance statute to enjoin gang members from "confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing,
threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or battering any residents or patrons, or visi-
tors to 'Rocksprings' . . . known to have complained about gang activities"), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2513 (1997). See also TEX. R v. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 125.062 (West 1997) (defining pub-
lic nuisance to include a "combination or criminal street gang that continuously or regularly
associates in organized criminal activities").
77. See State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. 1974) (stating that
"legislative bodies have great latitude in determining what is a public nuisance").
78. But see Spenard Action Comm. v. Evergreen Subdiv., 902 P.2d 766, 773 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that despite mandatory language in statute, court has "discretion to refuse to issue an
injunction or an order of abatement" under certain circumstances).
79. TE . REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 125.002 (West 1997) (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., id.
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the bond, closure or seizure is inevitable, a fact not lost on lav en-
forcement agencies in states where similar provisions exist."'
D. Public Nuisance Meets Civil Forfeiture: Making Matters Worse
Much of the use of public nuisance law in the last quarter of the
twentieth century can be traced to the explosion in the use of civil
forfeiture laws, which, in turn, can be traced to the commencement of
the War on Drugs in the 1970s. 2 The battle escalated with Congress's
passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 198483 that con-
tained increased fines and periods of imprisonment for drug-related
crimes. It also contained provisions for the civil forfeiture of property
related to particular criminal activity which were designed to reduce the
profitability of drug trading.e
1. Civil Forfeiture: From Punishment of Guilty People to Seizure
of Guilty Property
With origins distinct from those of public nuisance law, the law of
civil forfeiture is generally regarded as having ancient roots.s5 Over
81. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 823.114 (West 1997) (requiring removal and sale of all per-
sonal property used in connection with public nuisance conduct as well as "closure" of the
building or structure where it occurred for any purpose); Mica. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 6003825
(West 1997); cf. OR. REv. STAT. § 105.580 (1996) (discretionary closing of premises for one
year).
82. See Alfred W. McCoy, Heroin as a Global Commodity: A History of Soutizast Asia's
Opium Trade, in WAR ON DRUGS: STUDIES IN THE FAILURE OF US. NARCOnCS PoucY 237,261 (Al-
fred W. McCoy & Alan A. Block eds., 1992). The president described the policy as an all-
out "offensive" on heroin manufacturing sources in the Mediterranean region designed to eradi-
cate 80% of the supply of United Stated heroin. Although the policy was largely effective in
eradicating almost all of the heroin supplied to the U.S. from Turkey, the source of opium
production and distribution to the United States simply shifted eastward into Asia, and south
into Mexico. See id at 261-64.
83. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976-2040
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 21, 26, 28. 29 & 49 U.S.C.). Congress
recognized drug trafficking and racketeering as two of the most serious crime problems facing
the United States. See S. REP. No. 98-225, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 191-92 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3374-75.
84. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994) (subjecting to forfeiture "all real property, including
any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) . . . which is used, or intended
to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission" of a drug
crime); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 191-92 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3374-75.
85. Civil forfeiture's origins are traced to an ancient custom of forfeiting an inanimate object
involved in causing an accidental death. The value of the object, known as a deodand, often
provided the crown with a fund from which it might compensate the family of the deceased or
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time, three categories of property traditionally subject to forfeiture have
been identified. The first two categories----"pure contraband" and "pro-
ceeds"--were so closely connected to the illegal conduct that forfeiture
or destruction served the "obvious" and "powerful" government purpos-
es of removing the goods from commerce and providing restitution."
Although property in the third category may have had little connection
to the prohibited conduct, it was subject to forfeiture historically as
"tools or instrumentalities that a wrongdoer has used in the commission
of a crime."87  Examples of such property include ships used in the
course of acts of piracy or containers used to transport contraband.
Courts sometimes labelled this category of property as "guilty" for
purposes of seizure and forfeiture.
Such property also served important historical and practical goals to
not only "suppress[] the offence," but also to "insur[e] an indemnity to
the injured property."88  In forfeiture cases, courts often considered the
nature of the owner's relationship with the wrongdoer on the theory
that such a relationship might provide a basis for an innocent owner to
mitigate losses suffered in a forfeiture.89  The Court's language in
Dobbins's Distillery, illustrates the point:
[T]he legal conclusion must be that the unlawful acts of the
distiller bind the owner of the property, in respect to the man-
agement of the same, as much as if they were committed by
the owner himself. Power to that effect the law vests in him
by virtue of his lease; and, if he abuses his trust, it is a matter
engage in other charitable work in the community. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 & nn.18, 19 (1974); see also Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465
(1926) (holding that an innocent owner who entrusted the use of his possession to a wrongdoer
forfeited his property); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878) (holding that
the distilling equipment was subject to forfeiture notwithstanding the owner's ignorance of its
illegal use); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (holding that vessels used for piracy
may be attached by the government). Thus, civil forfeiture also differs from criminal forfei-
ture, which occurs after conviction of certain felonies or treason, and amounts to an element of
punishment for an offense. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2090
(1998) (distinguishing between criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture and holding that statutory
forfeiture following conviction must comply with Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause),
86. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 458-63 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 460.
88. Id. at 461 n.5; see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684.
89. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 677-78 & n.12 (discussing respective contractual
rights of owner and lessor at time of seizure); Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 465 (describing seller's
use of the car as "part consideration" for its sale, suggesting a contractual basis for the owner
to seek relief from the wrongdoer); Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 404; The Palmyra, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) at 14.
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to be settled between him and his lessor .... "
The "guilty property" aspect of civil forfeiture also served as a
basis for jurisdiction in admiralty and other in rem proceedings on the
theory that the status of property-not the owner-was at issue. 9' The
legal fiction concerning the "guilt" or "innocence" of property that
formed the procedural background for such a forfeiture proceeding
eventually evolved into its central substantive theme.92 As that theme
of "guilty property" flourished, the guilt or innocence of the owner be-
came irrelevant to the state's power to forfeit private property.93
That was not the case in a public nuisance action where the effec-
tiveness and availability of criminal prosecution and penalties were
traditionally highly relevant to a court's decision to permit equitable
abatement on behalf of the state.
94
Modem federal civil forfeiture laws have come to be regarded by
some as an effective and profitable weapon in the war on drugsS and
by others as a "virtual nightmare."'96 They have survived constitutional
attack on the grounds of double jeopardy,97 excessive fines,"8 and proce-
dural due process. 99 No longer merely a single weapon in the arsenal
90. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 404.
91. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 10.
92. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 469 (affirming forfeiture of car despite owncer's lack of
knowledge regarding use); Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 404 (atriming tax forfciture of
leased premises despite lessor's lack of knowledge).
93. Caero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-87.
94. See supra Part IA.
95. See Terrence P. Farley, Asset Forfeiture Reform: A Law Enforcement Response, 39
N.Y.L. ScI- L. REv. 149 (1994) (criticizing attempts to reform forfeiture law by reference to
positive effects enjoyed by federal agencies).
96. Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfeiture vs. Civil Liberties, 39 N.Y.L SCM. L REV. 95, 95 (1994)
(describing a number of civil liberties abuses). See also, e.g., Roger Pilon, Can American
Asset Forfeiture Law Be Justified, 39 N.Y.L SCH. L REv. 311 (1994) (answering "No" to the
question); Don Van Naha, Jr., Make Crime Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1996, at E16. See gen-
erally Symposium, What Price Civil Forfeiture?: Constitutional Implications and Reform Initia-
tives, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1 (1994) (held at New York Law School on March 5. 1994).
97. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 289 (1996) (holding that civil nature of in
rem proceedings for forfeiture are not sufficiently punitive to fall within scope of double jeop-
ardy clause).
98. Compare Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (holding that Eighth Amend-
ment's excessive fines clause applied to drug asset forfeiture and remanding for consideration in
light of court's opinion), with United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 4 F. Supp. 2d 65
(D.RI. 1998) (holding that, under circumstances of the case, forfeiture of home did not violate
Eighth Amendment).
99. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (holding




to fight the war on drugs, federal asset forfeiture appears to have be-
come a driving force in law enforcement strategy.'00 In 1994 alone,
the value of assets seized by federal officials through drug forfeiture
statutes amounted to more than one-half billion dollars.' Congress
also encouraged states to employ forfeiture techniques in concurrent
state proceedings.'0 2  The response was widespread adoption of the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act that allows state agencies, like their
federal counterparts, to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings without the
benefit of a state conviction.' 3
2. Civil Forfeiture and Public Nuisance Law: Many Similarities,
Significant Differences
Forfeiture actions and public nuisance proceedings to seize property
share many characteristics, not the least of which is that they are con-
ducted as civil, rather than criminal matters. Accordingly, prosecutors
need not prove their cases beyond a reasonable doubt as they would in
a criminal case. Instead, in both a forfeiture and a public nuisance
case, prosecutors may prevail by establishing their cases with only a
preponderance of the evidence or, in some states, a clear and convinc-
ing standard."°
Adverse inferences not permissible against criminal defendants may
be drawn against a defendant's refusal to testify in both a forfeiture
and a public nuisance case." 5 Evidence of past criminal conduct or
100. See Robert E. Bauman, Take It Away, 47 NAT'L REv., Feb. 20, 1995, at 34.
101. See 1994 ANN. REP. OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE ASSET FoRFEiTURE PROGRAM 35 (reporting that
more than $549.9 million in assets were seized in 1994, approximately half of which was
shared with state and local law enforcement agencies). The last year for which dollar figures
have been reported was 1994.
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (anti-preemption provision); City of Hartford v. Tucker, 621 A.2d
1339 (Conn. 1993) (existence of federal forfeiture proceeding did not require stay of state pro-
ceeding foreclosing tax lien on property); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 217 (1984), reprint-
ed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3400 (stating that new amendments in the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 would "enhance cooperation between Federal and State and local law
enforcement agencies").
103. See Uniform Controlled Substances Act § 503(b), 9 U.L.A. 584 (1994). Forty-eight
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have adopted either the
1970, 1990, or 1994 version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. See Tablq at 9
U.L.A. 1-2 (1994).
104. In Spenard Action Comm. v. Lot 3, 902 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1995), the Alaska Supreme
Court applied the clear and convincing standard to an action to abate a public nuisance after
reviewing similar public abatement laws in a number of other states. See Id. at 774-75 &
n.18.
105. Compare Griffin v. United States, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that Fifth Amend-
ment right to avoid self-incrimination prevents prosecutor from commenting on criminal defen-
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reputation can be used to establish the present existence of a nui-
sance." 6 Likewise, despite any applicability of the Excessive Fines and
Double Jeopardy Clauses, defendants in forfeiture and public nuisance
actions generally do not have the right to confront witnesses or to have
legal representation; in some cases they need not even be present."°
And, of course, both may result in the government's seizure of real or
personal property.
There are also important differences. Although reform is still need-
ed in the area of civil forfeiture, many forfeiture provisions contain
procedural safeguards for individual rights not found in public nuisance
statutes. For example, the federal and uniform state forfeiture acts
prohibit forfeiture where the property owner can establish innocence of
the underlying offense.' Few public nuisance statutes explicitly pro-
vide for such a defense,109 and now the Supreme Court has stated they
need not do so."0 While a right to a jury may exist under a state's
uniform forfeiture act,". a jury is generally not available in a public
nuisance action." 2
Because public nuisance statutes may produce results identical to
forfeiture statutes, including seizure of a home,"' the absence of even
dant's silence and court from instructing jury that adverse inference may be dram from si-
lence), with Whitaker v. Prince George's County, 514 A.2d 4 (Md. 1986) (holding that adverse
inference was permissible in a civil public nuisance case where the public nuisance defendant
invoked the Fifth Amendment to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to testify).
106. See, e.g., State v. Anthony, 647 N.E.2d 1368 (Ohio 1995) (holding evidence of
defendant's prior convictions admissible to establish existence of nuisance); People v. Griffin,
633 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (affirming permanent injunction closing residence as nui-
sance based, in part, on evidence regarding defendant's reputation).
107. See, e.g., State v. American Banking Ins. Co., 622 A.2d 261 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993) (default judgment). In Houston, Texas, a federal grant enables a state trial court to set
aside one week each month to sit as a civil asset forfeiture court. In "roughly half of the
trials," ad litem attorneys are appointed by the judge to represent property owners not respond-
ing to notice of the action. See Susan Borreson, Ill-Gotten Gains Up For Grabs In Asset For-
feiture Court, TEXAS LAwYER, Apr. 14, 1997, at 6.
108. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994); TEX. CODE CraM. P. ANN. art. 59 (West 1998). The
mere existence of the provision does not mean it works effectively. See Guerra, supra note 6,
at 344 (asserting that the defense has resulted in "troublesome" findings in the context of the
family).
109. See, e.g., TEX REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art § 125.001 (1997).
110. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
111. See People v. 6323 N. LaCrosse Ave., 634 N._.2d 743 (Il. 1994) (holding absence of
jury trial provision in state's drug asset forfeiture provision unconstitutional under state constitu-
tion).
112. See State v. Anthony, 647 N.E.2d 1368 (Ohio 1995) (no jury trial in nuisance abatement
case); People v. Allen, 767 P.2d 798 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
113. See, e.g., Bochas v. State, 951 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. CL App. 1997) (affirming forfeiture of
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the minimal protections contained in most forfeiture statutes is cause
for concern as law enforcement officials increasingly use public nui-
sance law to enhance their efforts to control, deter, and punish criminal
drug activity.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
IN THE HOME
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forces of the crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the
wind may blow through it-the storm may enter-the rain may
enter-but the King of England cannot enter-all his force
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!" 4
The young mother grew up in the neighborhood in which she now
lives. Her mother lives around the corner and is close enough to help
with the children on a regular basis. All of the children attend the
neighborhood public school, even her youngest-age 4-who is finally
eligible for the pre-kindergarten program the school offers. Recently a
young couple and their year-old infant moved in with her. She admits
that they've been a big help. She likes having the extra adults in the
house. Even with the additional child, the presence of three adults
makes her life easier than when it was just her and the three children.
The couple helps the mother with the children, especially in the morn-
ings on the days she works. The mother leaves for her job on a pro-
duction line before dawn four days a week and she's off in time to pick
the children up from school. Then, when she gets home, she can help
the couple with their baby. The rent they pay to her each month helps
too.
Whether a home is owned" 5 or leased, occupied by a single family
home owned by mother of drug offenders purchased for safety of grandchildren); Allen, 767
P.2d at 798 (affirming application of state nuisance provisions to forfeit wife's interest in
home). See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
114. William Pitt, Address in the House of Commons (1763), in OXFORD DICMONARY OF QUOTA-
rIONS 379 (2d ed. 1953), quoted in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958). The
Miller court reversed a conviction where police entered the defendant's home without a warrant
and without notice of authority or purpose. Twelve years after Miller, Justice Stevens noted
the force of William Pitt's moving oratory: "There can be no doubt that Pitt's address in the
House of Commons in March 1763 echoed and re-echoed throughout the Colonies." Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n.54 (1980).
115. The most common form of privately-held real property is the American home. The
1991 Census data states that 64% of all households reported being homeowners. See Bureau
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or shared by unrelated persons, privately-owned or publicly subsidized,
one's home is unquestionably "property."'"16  Yet, a home is more than
any property rights that may attach to it. Rather, it is the product of a
unique combination of values that transform a house into a home."' It
represents values that are expressed in the exercise of individual liber-
ties regarding such things as marriage,"' family" 9 and childbearing, 2 '
education"' and school," security," and marital relations' for which
of the Census, Homeownership: 1989 to 1991 (June 1992), noted in Julia P. Forrester, Mort-
gaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of
Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL L. REV. 373, 456 n.177 (1994).
116. Blackstone suggests that the home or "habitation" may have been the first object to
which societies recognized property interests, even before the land upon which it sat:
In the case of habitations in particular, it was natural to observe that even the brute
creation, to whom every thing else was in common, maintained a kind of permanent
property in their dwellings, especially for the protection of their young; that the birds
of the air had their nests, and the beasts of the field had caverns, the invasion of
which they esteemed a very flagrant injustice, and would sacrifice their lives to pre-
serve them. Hence a property was soon established in every man's house and
home-stall ....
2 WnuiM BLAmcSTON, COMENrtARIES, *4. See also EDwARD KESIS LIBErrY, PR OE'Y AqD PRi-
VACY: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBSTANnvE DUE PROCESS 6-10 (1996) (describing property in
general as one of three "core values" government is obligated to protect).
117. Professor Margaret Radin has described the home's place in American law in quasi-mys-
tical terms: "Our reverence for the sanctity of the home is rooted in the understanding that the
home is inextricably part of the individual, the family, and the fabric of society." Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L REv. 957, 1013 (1982). In a recent article,
Professor Joan Williams describes ownership of a single-family house as an "American obses-
sion" that has greatly influenced the American legal landscape. See Joan Williams, The Rheto-
ric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 326 (1998). Professor Williams finds that this obsession
arises, in part, from a non-legal, intuitive sense about the nature of property that is embedded
in American property law. See id. at 278. She notes that although a widespread distribution
of property may have resulted from this obsession, it also has a "dark underside" that has
resulted in the exclusion of minorities and the poor from achieving home ownership. See Id.
at 328.
118. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
119. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment prevents zoning ordinance from defining "family" to only a few catego-
ries of related individuals).
120. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming and certain rights of
women of childbearing age).
121. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment prevents the prohibition of foreign language classes in parochial school).
122. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (Oregon statute requiring atten-
dance at public school rather than at parochial school found to be violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
123. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that it is the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
(Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantiess, unconsented entry into home to effect a felony ar-
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the law provides protection. The Constitution recognizes the connection
between these individual liberties and the home by offering several
forms of protection to the property rights associated with the home and
the "privacies of life" occurring within it. 1 5  This part will examine
two of them: the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.
126
The next part will examine the protections provided the home under the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.
A. The Fourth Amendment Provides Explicit Textual Protection
for the Home
The Fourth Amendment' embodies the sentiments expressed in the
moving oratory of William Pitt regarding the importance of the home
as against government intrusion. 2 The Fourth Amendment's language
is explicit: it guards "persons, houses, papers, and effects from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures."' 29  The heart of its protection, as it has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court, is not the structure of the
home, but rather the individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."' 3
Although it is clear that the Amendment "protects people, not plac-
es,'' i the individual's expectation of privacy is generally greater the
more closely related it is to the home.3 2
rest).
124. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
125. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (describing "essence of con-
stitutional liberty and security" as "apply[ing] to all invasions, on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life").
126. Of course, other provisions may provide protection for rights connected with the home
as well. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet., 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (holding that Equal Protection
Clause prohibited state from imposing double-rent bond as prerequisite to tenant-in-possession's
appeal in landlord's action for possession).
127. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particular-
ly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
128. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
130. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Arguably, this
language refers to "searches" and not to "seizures." That is not to say, however, that the
Amendment does not prohibit seizures of the home. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56
(1992).
131. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
132. Compare Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (reversing drug conviction where
officers failed to knock and announce prior to entering defendant's residence), with Oliver v.
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1. Protecting Privacy by Preventing Unreasonable Government
Entry into the Home
Typically, Fourth Amendment issues arise in a criminal proceeding
when a criminal defendant challenges the validity of the arrest' or the
seizure of things or information later used at trial against the defen-
dant. 34 However, the Amendment's protection for "every household-
er", 3 5 is not limited to the criminal law; it extends to a range of cir-
cumstances in the civil arena as well.' Regardless of the context, a
Fourth Amendment analysis begins with a determination whether the
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (holding that expectation of privacy in open fields
outside of curtilage of home is not reasonable). That is not to say that circumstances not in-
volving the home do not implicate an expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967) (holding that fire inspector's
warrantless, unconsented search of warehouse without probable cause to believe that any code
violation existed violated Fourth Amendment); see generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E.
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy In Fourth Amendment Cases:
An Empirical Look at "Understandings RecognL-ed and Permitted by Soclety/' 42 DtuE U.
727 (1993) (asserting that Court's stated willingness to rely on "society understandings" about
expectations of privacy, does not correlate with actual understandings of innocent members of
society).
133. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (holding warrantess,
nonconsensual entry into suspect's home for routine felony arrest violated Fourth Amendment);
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) (reversing conviction on Fourth Amendment
grounds where warrantless arrest occurred in defendant's home).
134. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995) (remanding and holding that
whether officers knocked and announced prior to entry must be considered in determining con-
stitutional reasonableness of search of home).
135. See, e.g, Miller, 357 U.S. at 313. In Miller, the Court reversed the defendant's con-
viction by holding that an officer's warrantless entry into home after ripping the chain off the
door, violated the Fourth Amendment. See it at 313-14. Writing for six members of the
Court, Justice Brennan stated: "Every householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the
innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest against unlawful
invasion of the house." Jd at 313.
136. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 42 (1993) (hold-
ing that Fourth Amendment places limits on government's ability to seize real property for pur-
poses of civil forfeiture); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992) (holding Fourth
Amendment protected individual's property rights in mobile home when county deputies partici-
pated in wrongful eviction); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding
Fourth Amendment requires warrant prior to administrative search of residence absent exigent
circumstances), rev'g Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (rejecting homeown e's Fourth
Amendment challenge to conviction for violation of public nuisance law after he refused to
permit a municipal inspector from entering premises without a warrant). See also Flatford v.
City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that Fourth Amendment requires,
absent exigent circumstances, "pre-eviction judicial oversight" to tenants forced to leave apart-
ments because of owners' violations of local building or housing codes); Richmond Tenants
Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300, 1309 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding Due Process Clause protects
tenants of public housing from summary eviction).
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government's conduct amounts to a "search" or "seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 1 7  This determination is made
without reference to the nature of the government's interest in the con-
duct but rather by reference to the degree of the individual's expecta-
tion of privacy.' It is defined as a "meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property."' 39  If a warrantless
search or seizure falls within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it
is presumed unreasonable. 4  From that point, a "careful balancing of
governmental and private interests"'141 occurs to determine whether the
warrantless conduct is nevertheless reasonable under the circumstanc-
es.14
2
The 1967 case of Camara v. Municipal Court43 is widely regarded
as the first case in which the Court explicitly applied the Fourth
Amendment to circumstances where the individual was not suspected of
criminal behavior. 44  Unwilling to permit a building code enforcement
official to enter his home during a routine administrative inspection, the
plaintiff challenged the ordinance that authorized the city's unconsented
entry into the home. The Supreme Court struck the ordinance, holding
that the unconsented entry of a government official into a private home
amounted to a "significant intrusion[] upon the interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment."' 4  In reaching its conclusion that a municipal
ordinance authorizing the warrantless, unconsented entry into a private
home without any requirement of probable cause violated the Fourth
Amendment, the Court balanced the government's interest in protecting
the health and safety of the public on the one hand, against the
individual's right to be free from unreasonable entries into the home,
137. See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 534 (determining that inspection of residence to deter-
mine compliance with housing code fell within Fourth Amendment). But see Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971) (holding that caseworker's home visit to AFDC applicant was not
a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because its purpose was "rehabilita-
tive" rather than "investigatory").
138. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 132, at 754.
139. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 61.
140. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
141. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71.
142. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
143. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
144. Eight years earlier, a divided Court held otherwise in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959). In Frank, the Court affirmed the defendant's conviction under municipal code for
refusing to allow a city inspector entry into his home to inspect for suspected nuisance.
145. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). But see Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309 (1971) (social worker's unconsented entry into AFDC applicant's home for "investiga-
tive" or "rehabilitative" purpose did not implicate Fourth Amendment).
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on the other. It identified the rights protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment in terms of privacy:
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a
grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from sur-
veillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent. 46
The Camara Court describes the Fourth Amendment's safeguards
for an individual's home in terms of the individual's right of privacy.
However, just as privacy rights receive constitutional protection from
provisions other than the Fourth Amendment,'47 the Fourth Amendment
protects more than abstract notions of "privacy." Indeed, there is some
support for the theory that the Fourth Amendment was originally re-
garded as offering protection to individual property rights,' which also
are protected elsewhere in the Constitution.'49 Before examining alter-
nate sources of constitutional protection for privacy and property inter-
ests later in this Article, the next section will consider the Fourth
Amendment's protection of an individual's property rights in her home.
2. The Fourth Amendment Also Protects Property Rights
in the Home
The Supreme Court recently affirmed the application of the Fourth
Amendment in civil matters implicating possessory rather than privacy
rights. In Soldal v. Cook County,5' the Court reviewed the conduct of
146. Camara, 387 U.S. at 529 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
147. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court noted:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment
in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
Id at 484.
148. See generally Radin, supra note 117, at 957, 996-1002 (discussing the Fourth Amend-
ment and its protection of property rights).
149. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra Part Ill.
150. 506 U.S. 56 (1992).
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several county deputy sheriffs in connection with a landlord's removal
of a mobile home from a rented lot. Although the landlord had previ-
ously filed an eviction proceeding against the plaintiff in state court, it
sought and received assistance from the deputies to remove the mobile
home prior to a hearing, much less a judgment in its favor.' Reject-
ing the defendants' arguments that the Fourth Amendment was not
applicable because it did not protect the individual's property rights
unless privacy interests were also implicated,'52 the Court held that the
homeowner's property interests in the home were protected by the
Fourth Amendment even in the absence of intrusion upon privacy.
Although the Court suggested that the Fourth Amendment may not
protect possessory interests in other types of property, the Soldal deci-
sion makes clear that the Fourth Amendment does protect possessory
rights in the home.'53 Thus, the demolition of a home pursuant to a
municipal public nuisance ordinance, without the prior authorization of
a judicial officer, may violate the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard under Soldal.'54 Even when conduct implicating individual
liberty and property rights satisfies the Fourth Amendment, additional
analysis may be required under other provisions of the Constitution.,"
B. Substantive Due Process Protects the Values Expressed in the Home
In a number of cases, the Court has closely associated the home
with individual privacy rights regarding marriage, childbearing, and
education and has protected them from government interference by
reference not to the Fourth Amendment, but to principles of substantive
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.'56
151. See id. at 58-60.
152. See id at 65.
153. See id. at 64 n.7.
154. See Thomas v. City of Dallas, No. 3:94-CV-0214-R, 1997 WL 560615 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
29, 1997); Bums v. City of Dallas, No. 3-94-CV-2770-R, 1997 WL 118424 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
12, 1997).
155. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (even
assuming pre-hearing seizure of forfeitable real property satisfied Fourth Amendment, analysis
still required under Due Process Clause); see also Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163 (8th
Cir. 1996) (sustaining public nuisance demolition after independent review for reasonableness
under Fourth Amendment in addition to Fourteenth Amendment analysis regarding procedural
due process).
156. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (describing such matters as "cen-
tral to liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court has suggested that refer-
ence to these "other" interests or values are necessary to define the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 132.
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1. Protection for Core Values Associated with Traditional
Family Life
These core values are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause'57 regardless of their source within the constitution
and "regardless of the fairness" of the government conduct affecting
them."'58  Not easily reduced to a simple formula,'59 the Court has
described its approach to substantive due process by reference to Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman: 60
[Substantive due process] is a rational continuum which, broad-
ly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also rec-
ognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that
certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify their abridgment.' 6 '
Despite expressions of unwillingness to avoid substituting its judg-
ment for what appears to be a reasonable exercise of legislative power,
the Court nevertheless has stricken state and local regulations when it
concluded that the regulation intruded too severely upon the exercise of
fundamental individual rights. 62 The test it employed balances those
rights against "the demands of organized society"'63 and requires courts
to scrutinize the legislation to determine whether it too severely impos-
es upon individual liberties. For example, the Court has struck other-
157. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "INlor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." US.
CONST. amend. XIV. Nearly identical language applicable against the federal government is
contained in the Fifth Amendment: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
Because the subject of this Article is state nuisance abatement statutes, references to the
Due Process Clause will be to the provision, applicable against the states, contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment, unless stated otherwise.
158. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
159. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
160. 367 U.S. 497, 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
161. Id, quoted in Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 848.
162. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), in which the Court
struck, on substantive due process grounds, a housing ordinance limiting occupancy of a dwell-
ing to certain related individuals. Justice Powell wrote, "[W]hen the government intrudes on
choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance
of governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
regulation." Id at 499.
163. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted with approval
in Moore, 431 U.S. at 501-02.
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wise legitimate exercises of the police power in the form of zoning
ordinances'64 and compulsory education laws'65 when it has concluded
that they intrude too deeply upon what it concludes are core, funda-
mental rights. 66 A common thread among the Court's analysis of fun-
damental rights is the articulated connection between the rights under
consideration and the home. For example, in Stanley v. Georgia,67 the
Court invalidated a Georgia statute that criminalized the private posses-
sion of obscene materials. Holding that a conviction under the statute
for merely possessing obscene materials within one's home implicated
rights of privacy as well as rights regarding speech, Justice Marshall
wrote:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's minds.'68
Likewise, in Griswold v. Connecticut,'69 Justice Goldberg's image of
government officials searching "the sacred precincts of the marital bed-
rooms" 17 for evidence of unlawful contraceptive devices suggests the
close connection between the home and rights exercised within it.
While the Court has refused to extend the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment to all private, consensual conduct occurring within the
home,' it has nevertheless characterized those rights the Amendment
does protect in terms of the intimacy, privacy, and security that are
164. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 494 (occupancy limits on dwelling units struck because of re-
striction to certain statutory definitions of family); cf Village of Belle Terre v. Borans, 415
U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding ordinance prohibiting certain unrelated persons from living together),
165. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state law prohibiting parochial
school education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (although state law designed to re-
quire English as students' primary language was within police power, provision forbidding the
teaching of the German language violated due process protection).
166. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (reversing conviction for possession of ob-
scene reading materials).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 565.
169. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
170. Id. at 485-86.
171. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to extend constitutional protec-
tion to consensual homosexual conduct on the theory that such conduct was not a fundamental
right). Although the Court acknowledged a connection between substantive due process protec-
tion and rights regarding heterosexual family and marriage, it refused to connect those rights to
homosexual conduct See id. at 190-91.
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associated with the home.172
2. Protection of Individual, Not Economic, Interests
Despite the occasional protestation to the contrary,"n the Court has
generally reserved the careful, painstaking scrutiny of the police power
it employs under the Due Process Clause for those cases in which it
concludes that only certain fundamental, individual liberties are at
stake. 74 On the other hand, at least until recently, where state regula-
tion adversely affected economic or property rights and not individual
liberties, the Court appeared to substitute reliance upon the legislative
articulation of legitimate state goals for rigorous analysis.'71
An example is Moore v. City of East Cleveland,76 in which the
Court struck an ordinance that limited dwelling occupancy to single
families and defined families to include only limited kinds of blood
relationships.'" Application of the ordinance resulted in the criminal
conviction of Inez Moore who lived in her home with an adult son, his
child and the child of another son. 78  Acknowledging its traditional
practice of deferring to land-use regulations as valid exercises of the
police power in cases where fundamental rights were not at stake,179
the Court nevertheless held that such deference is "inappropriate" when
the regulation "slic[es] deeply into the family itself."' 80  Noting that
operation of the regulation had the result of criminalizing a
grandmother's living arrangement with her son and grandsons, the
Court held that the ordinance's impact on the household was too great
to sustain it under the substantive Due Process Clause.'"'
172. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
173. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
174. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting argument that private ho-
mosexual activity was a fundamental right).
175. Of course, the Court has been reluctant to admit to any such distinction. See, e.g.,
Lynch, 406 U.S. at 542-46; United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 & nA
(1938). The famous footnote is widely regarded as the source of the approach. The historical
roots and transformation of the Court's substantive due process doctrine are summarized suc-
cinctly in Lawrence Berger, Public Use, Substantive Due Process and Takings--An Integration,
74 NEB. L. REv. 843, 846-52 (1995).
176. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
177. See id. at 496.
178. See id.
179. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Borans, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (involving land use pro-
vision limiting occupancy of single-fumily dwellings to those occupied by unlimited number of
persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption or not more than two unrelated persons); Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (comprehensive land use ordinance).
180. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498.
181. See id. at 499 (citing Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ulhman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)).
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Recent cases suggest that the Court has moved to close the gap
between constitutional protection for individual liberties and constitu-
tional protection for economic property rights in at least one area under
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause-regulatory takings law." 2  Part
III examines the area of regulatory takings as it considers the constitu-
tional protection for the home as property under the Fifth Amendment.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE HOME AS PROPERTY
The mother paid $3,000.00 down for the house and borrowed the
rest from an individual lender to whom she has agreed to pay $427
each month for ten years. The lender reports that she often pays in
excess of the monthly payment and if she continues to do so she will
pay off the note in less than ten years. She is responsible for taxes
and all maintenance on the house. Recently, she and her tenants
bought several cans of paint and brushes and spent the weekend paint-
ing in time for Easter. If the police board up the house as they have
told her, she won't be able to live there, but she will still be responsi-
ble for the mortgage payments, taxes, and the upkeep of the house. If
she has to pay rent to live elsewhere, she won't be able to continue
making her payments on the house. And if she can't keep up with the
payments, then she's likely to lose the house. Although the lender says
he will try to work with her, business is business and there are no
guarantees.
Legal scholars rarely define property as simply a thing, but as an
individual's rights with respect to a thing.' Such rights generally
include the right to use,'84 possess, 85 and transfer"6 the thing, such as a
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore with
approval).
182. According to one tally, the Court has held government conduct to be constitutionally
infirm in four out of nine cases over the last ten years. See Robert Brauneis, The Foundation
of Our "Regulatory Takings" Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opin-
ion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE LJ. 613 (1996). Professor Brauncis notes
that the Court's decisions since 1986 amount to a trend when compared to only four cases of
constitutional infirmity in 200 years prior to 1986. See, e.g., Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
396 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for applying substantive due process
analysis in property case); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
183. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF Em NENT DOMAtN 58-59
(1985); Williams, supra note 117 (identifying traditional and alternative approaches to analyzing
property rights); see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964) (describing the "essence of property," as "fluidity" and defining it as "the end result of
a process of competition among inconsistent and contending economic values").
184. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (noting that "right
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home. Property rights in the home often enjoy a preferred status under
state and federal law. For example, federal tax law provides deduc-
tions for amounts paid as interest on the purchase of a taxpayer's pri-
mary residence"'7 and most states provide homestead exemptions to pro-
tect homes from general creditors.' In addition, Congress has declared
it a national goal that "every American family be able to afford a de-
cent home in a suitable environment."'I 9
A. Protecting Property?
As "property," the home receives constitutional protection under the
Fifth Amendment which provides that no person shall "be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation."' 90 Howev-
er, describing a home as "property" does not protect it from confisca-
tion, much less provide compensation if the home is seized as a public
nuisance."9' Indeed, a public nuisance action may not only leave a
homeowner without the use of her home, but it may also require her to
pay for the investigative costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the state
in seeking the abatement. 92
This paradox has its roots in Mugler v. Kansas,"3 which, as dis-
to coal for practical purposes is the right to mine coal"), wih Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915) (sustaining ordinance preventing plaintiffs use of land for brickmaking despite
value of soil for bricks but expressing no opinion on whether the owner could continue to
"use" land by transporting clay for brickmaking elsewhere).
185. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
186. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (sustaining against takings challenge fed-
eral regulation prohibiting sale of eagle feathers without regard to when the feathers were col-
lected).
187. See I.R.C. § 163 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
188. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
189. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L No. 101-625, § 101, 104
Stat. 4085 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12701 (1994)). See Forrester, supra note 115, at 393-409
(1994) (describing federal support of the mortgage market, federal tax policy, bankruptcy law,
and federal pre-emption of state law as constituting comprehensive federal effort to promote
home ownership).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
191. See, e.g., State v. Anthony, 647 N.E.2d 1368 (Ohio 1995) (affirming abatement order
padlocking home for one year); State v. Griffin, 633 N.E.2d 773 (II1. Ct. App. 1993) (affirm-
ing public nuisance injunction preventing use of defendant's residence for any purpose for one
year).
192. See City of Oakland v. McCullough, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Ct. App. 1996) (affirming as
modified post-closing order awarding the city attorneys' fees and investigative costs incurred in
pursuing abatement of drug house).
193. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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cussed in Part I above, distinguished between the power of eminent
domain to appropriate property for public use 1 4 and the police power
to control public nuisance conduct.'95 Believing that only the former
required compensation, while the latter did not, Justice Harlan wrote:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by
individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health,
the morals, or the safety of the public, is not . . . burdened
with the condition that the State must compensate such individ-
ual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of
their not being permitted, by a noxious use of the property to
inflict injury upon the community. 96
The notion that states might prevent harmful activity through the
exercise of the police power without compensation played an important
role in the development of the Court's takings jurisprudence under the
Fifth Amendment.' 97 This was especially true in the development of
land-use regulations, in which public nuisance law continued to occupy
an important place. For example, in cases such as Reinman v. City of
Little Rock 9 and Hadacheck v. Sebastian,99 the Court refined the anal-
ysis articulated in Mugler:
[I]t is clearly within the police power of the State to regulate
the business and to that end to declare that in particular cir-
194. That is not to say, however, that all clearly identified appropriations "for public use" are
uncontroversial. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (affirm-
ing legislation designed to re-distribute land ownership as a legitimate public use); Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (affirming city's at-
tempt to acquire privately held land in residential neighborhood for transfer to General Motors
for construction of for-profit assembly plant); Growing Pains: Mall's Expansion Claims Neigh-
borhood, DALLAS MORNIG NEws, Feb. 1, 1998, at 9A, available in 1998 WL 2510031 (reporting
controversy over city's appropriation of residential neighborhood for expansion of privately-
owned shopping mall).
195. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (affirming destruction of ornamental
cedar trees under Virginia public nuisance statute to prevent spread of disease potentially harm-
ful to apple orchards); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (affirming misdemeanor
conviction for violating Los Angeles municipal ordinance prohibiting brick manufacturing),
196. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added).
197. Professor Richard Epstein explains, "The most distinctive aspect of the police power
under the eminent domain clause has been its antinuisance component." EPSTEIN, supra note
183, at 112. Increasingly, scholars have criticized its place within the law of takings. See,
e.g., Halper, supra note 9; John Fulton Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for
Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996).
198. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
199. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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cumstances and in particular localities a livery stable shall be
deemed a nuisance . . . provided this power is not exerted
arbitrarily, or with unjust discrimination, so as to infringe upon
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."a
However, even when land-use regulations were not nuisance-centered,
the Court continued to return to the reasoning articulated in AMugler,
Reinman, and Hadacheck. The comprehensive zoning plan at issue in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.2" provides an example. Analogizing the
comprehensive plan to regulation of individual land uses "likely to
create nuisances,"2 "2 the Court found it to be a valid exercise of the po-
lice powers notwithstanding any loss in value an individual property
owner might suffer as a result of the scheme.2 3
Euclid's analogy to public nuisance controls was not unique. Over
and again, the Court has sustained regulations against constitutional
attack on the ground that they-like public nuisance controls-were
designed to prevent harmful consequences that would likely occur if the
regulations did not stand.2  From very early in the century, however,
scholars recognized that the police power's ability to engage in regula-
200. Reinman, 237 U.S. at 176. In both cases, municipal ordinances prohibited certain exist-
ing businesses from operating within designated areas of the city because of their "effect on the
health and comfort of the community." Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410-11 (describing similarities
with Reinman case). Plaintiffs in both cases owned businesses outlawed by the ordinanc-
es-livery stables in Reinan; a brickyard in Hadacheck-and both argued that their property
would be significantly diminished in value if the ordinances prohibited them from conducting
their business where they were currently located. See Reinman, 237 U.S. at 172-73. In
Hadacheck, the Court assumed the prohibition against brickmaking within city limits caused the
plaintiff to suffer an 80% reduction in value of his property. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at
405. In Reinman, the Court stated only that the economic losses would be "significant7 and
did not provide sufficient information to determine precise calculations. Acknowledging the
economic losses suffered by the plaintiffs in both cases, the Court sustained both ordinances
and found them to be properly within the scope of the city's powers. See Relnman, 237 U.S.
at 171; Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 414.
201. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
202. Id. at 387. Oddly, the Court did not identify specifically whether it was referring to
private or public nuisances. See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992) (holding ban on construction on petitioner's residential lots constituted a "taking," there-
by entitling him to compensation).
203. See Eucid, 272 U.S. at 385 (75% reduction in value).
204. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987) (sus-
taining statute designed to minimize subsidence of surface area in coal regions as controlling
activity "akin to a public nuisance"); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979) (rejecting a
takings challenge to a federal conservation scheme designed to "prevent the destruction" of cer-




tion to prevent harm to the public without compensation for any de-
struction of economic value was often difficult to distinguish from a




Fortunately, in light of the inherent difficulty of determining wheth-
er a regulation prevents a harm or secures a benefit, °6 the harm-pre-
vention analysis is only one of three major threads courts have used in
weaving the fabric of regulatory takings doctrine." 7 The second major
thread is the so-called "physical invasion test," which determines wheth-
er the regulation compels the property owner "to suffer a physical 'in-
vasion' of his property., 20 8  In contrast to the harm-prevention analysis,
which tolerates "significant" reductions in economic value under the
police power without compensation, the physical invasion test will not
tolerate even a "minute" physical intrusion without satisfying the consti-
tutional requirement of just compensation. 9 Applying this analysis, the
Court invalidated a New York statute designed "to facilitate tenant ac-
cess to cable television" by requiring landlords to permit the placement
of one-half inch television cables on their property without compensa-
210tion.
Under Loretto, the degree of economic loss is irrelevant to the
205. See ERNST FREuND, THE POLICE POWER § 511 (1904).
206. Numerous courts have attempted to distinguish between preventing a harm and conferring
a benefit. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). Scholars, too,
have remarked that the difference is often in the eyes of the beholder. See, e.g., Frank
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
207. See Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Su-
preme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Cr. REV. 63, 75 (describing the Court's takings
jurisprudence as a "crazy quilt pattern").
208. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (describing cate-
gory of compensatory regulation and citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp,,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) as an example).
209. See id.
210. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423. The Court was unequivocal on the takings Issue:
"Teleprompter's cable installation on appellant's building constitutes a taking under the tradition-
al test." Id. However, it expressed no opinion on what amount of compensation was just.
See id. at 441. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals sustained the power of a regula-
tory commission created by the statute to set $1.00 "just." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 1983). Compare Respublica v. Caldwell, I U.S. 150 (1
Dall.) (1785) (rejecting nuisance defense that construction increased value of wharf).
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takings analysis, just as it is irrelevant to a harm-prevention analysis.2
In contrast, such loss forms the core of the "diminution-in-value test"
first announced in Justice Holmes's famous opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.
212
2. Diminution in Value
The diminution-in-value test announced in Mahon is considered to
be the origin of the Court's modem approach to regulatory takings
law.2" 3 Mahon is a case arising from the attempts of the Mahon family
to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining anthracite coal
from beneath their home.14 In an 1878 deed, the company had con-
veyed only "the surface" of the parcel to the Mahon family where the
family home was located. The company retained for itself the "right to
remove all the coal" from it and obtained a waiver from the Mahons of
any right to complain about the collapse of the surface resulting from
the company's mining activities.15 Some years later, the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted the Kohler Act to prevent the mining of coal where
it would cause "subsidence" of the surface.2 t6  Although the statute ef-
fectively nullified the waiver, the company notified the Mahons that it
intended to exercise its rights under the deed.!" When the Mahons
sought an injunction under the statute to prevent the company from
proceeding, the company argued that the regulation deprived it of prop-
erty without due process, took its property without compensation, and
impaired its right to enter into contracts.218  Rejecting the family's
argument that the statute was a legitimate exercise of Pennsylvania's
police power, Justice Holmes agreed. After a brief recitation of the
facts, Holmes framed the issue before the Court as follows: "As applied
to this case the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights
211. Compare Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408 (1915) (no taking despite 87 1/2%
diminution in property's value), with Loretto, 446 N.E.2d at 428 (affirming S1.00 as "just com-
pensation" for regulatory taking despite finding that regulatory action Increased property's val-
ue).
212. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
213. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 1014 (1992) (discussing
origins of regulatory takings doctrine); Brauneis, supra note 183, at 615-19, 670-71 (acknowl-
edging importance of Mahon to regulatory taking law, but suggesting its concepts were not
"radically novel").
214. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
215. Id.
216. See id at 400.
217. See id at 412.
218. See id. at 394-95.
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of property and contract. The question is whether the police power can
be stretched so far."219
Finding "the right to mine coal" to be valuable only if one can
exercise the right to extract it, Justice Holmes concluded that by mak-
ing it "commercially impracticable to mine certain coal (the statute] has
very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating
or destroying it."220  He acknowleded that "[g]ovemment could hardly
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the general law.""22
Holmes also considered it to be a "natural tendency of human nature"
to continue to exercise the police power, "until at last private property
disappears." '222 He concluded, "[t]he general rule, at least, is that which
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking." '223
Holding that a regulation could go "too far," Justice Holmes identi-
fied limits to a legislature's ability to enact regulations that diminish
property values without compensation, something that the Court had
been unwilling to do only a short time earlier.224 Indeed, in a vigorous
dissent, Justice Brandeis, relying on the precedent of Mugler, consid-
ered the regulation to be a valid exercise of the police power which
required no compensation. He stated, "[r]estriction upon use does not
become inappropriate as a means, merely because it deprives the owner
of the only use to which the property can then be profitably put."225
Mahon's influence on takings law cannot be understated. 26  Never-
theless, as courts struggled to give meaning to Holmes's "too far" test,
little changed for property owners suffering uncompensated losses
227
caused by regulatory action. Indeed, as late as 1978, the Court still
219. Id. at 413.
220. Id. at 414.
221. Id. at 413.
222. Id. at 415.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1913) (holding that state
statute did not unconstitutionally deprive mine owner of his property although it required pillar
of coal to be left in place for protection of mine workers).
225. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
226. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATs PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITrION (1977); RIcHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POwER oF EMNENT DOMAIN (1985); Michelman, supra
note 206; Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81
YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, supra note 183. Recent scholarship examining Mahon include:
Brauneis, supra note 182, and Halper, supra note 9.
227. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that
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struggled to give meaning to Holmes's "too far" test in the regulatory
context, as it went behind Mahon to the public nuisance cases from
which the noxious use doctrine arose to support broad regulatory pov-
ers that significantly diminished economic values. 8
That struggle emerged in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York, 9 in which the Court considered plaintiffs' challenge to
the application of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law to the
Grand Central Station Terminal. Plaintiffs argued that the law would
force them to forego significant economic benefits and suffer great
economic loss. Noting that "[l]egislation designed to promote the gen-
eral welfare commonly burdens some more than others," Justice
Brennan relied upon public nuisance law" ° for the proposition that
government actions that prohibit pre-existing conduct involving no
"blameworthiness" or "moral wrongdoing7' 2  may, nevertheless, consti-
tutionally cause significant economic loss without compensation. As he
rejected plaintiffs' takings challenge and sustained the application of the
law despite great economic losses, Justice Brennan temporarily extended
the life of the harm-prevention exception to the Fifth Amendment. 2
Not until Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 3 seventy years
after Mahon and 14 years after Penn Central, did the Court expressly
reject the notion that a legislative goal of preventing harm was suffi-
cient justification for land-use regulations when they also diminished
property values.24
C. Lucas and Limited Government Powers
At issue in Lucas was a provision of South Carolina's Beachfront
Management Act, which prohibited the construction of "occupiable im-
Pennsylvania statute enacted to control subsidence of surface through coal mining was an exer-
cise of police power "to abate activity akin to a public nuisance"); Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
228. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34 n.30 (1978).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 133 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (rejecting tak-
ings challenge to ordinance preventing operation of an existing sand and gravel mining busi-
ness); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
231. Penn Cent Transp., 438 U.S. at 133 n.30 (citing Sax, supra note 183. at 50).
232. See also Keystone Coal Bituminous Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 490 (1987)
("mhe State's exercise of its police power to prevent . . . impending danger" is proper and
does not require compensation.).




provements" 2" on David Lucas's two beachfront lots. David Lucas did
not dispute the statute's validity "as a lawful exercise of South
Carolina's police power," but instead, he argued that he was entitled to
compensation because of the Act's "complete extinguishment of his
property's value." 6  A South Carolina trial court agreed and ordered
the state to pay more than $1.2 million as "just compensation." The
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed. Citing Mugler v. Kansas, the
state's high court held that because the regulation was "designed to
prevent serious public harm" in the form of beach erosion,237 the state
need not compensate the owner for any loss in property value suffered
as a result of the enforcement of the regulation.
The Supreme Court disagreed and, as it did so, it re-cast the
Court's reliance on the harm-prevention doctrine that evolved from
public nuisance law as the "progenitor of our more contemporary state-
ments that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantial-
ly advance[s] legitimate state interests.' ' 238
[l]t becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as
a touchstone to distinguish regulatory "takings"--which require
compensation-from regulatory deprivations that do not require
compensation. A fortiori the legislature's recitation of a nox-
ious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our
categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensat-
ed. 239
Justice Scalia went further and provided a framework for analysis
of "confiscatory regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all economi-
cally beneficial use of land."24  The inquiry, he announced, required
examination into the "background principles" of the "State's law of
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise."' 4 He
provided more specific instructions:
235. Id. at 1009.
236. Id.
237. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 901-02 (S.C. 1991), rev'd,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
238. 505 U.S. at 1023-24 (citations omitted).
239. ld at 1026.
240. Id. at 1029.
241. Id Professor Louise Halper criticizes the Court for its reliance on private nuisance law.
See Halper, supra note 9.
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The "total taking" inquiry will ordinarily entail . . . analysis of,
among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and
resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's
proposed activities. . the social value of the claimant's activi-
ties and their suitability to the locality in question, . . . and the
relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or
adjacent private landowners) .... ."'
Rejecting simple harm-prevention as a justification for land-use regula-
tions that completely diminish the value of the property, Justice Scalia
provided a balancing test that distanced the Court from the expansive
view of govemment power expressed in Mugler. Instead, he rejected
the State's ability to rely upon the mere articulation of a legitimate
goal as a substitute for meaningful analysis of whether the means used
achieved that goal.243 In so doing, the Court relieved the burden on the
property owner to show that the state's action was illegitimate and
shifted it to the state to demonstrate that its action is consistent with
"background principles of nuisance and property law" that prohibit the
uses proscribed by the statute.2" It concluded that "[o]nly on this
showing can the state fairly claim that, in proscribing all such benefi-
cial uses, the . . .Act is taking nothing." '45
Although this shifting burden may provide some relief for property
owners, it does not provide much guidance for courts on selecting the
background principles to apply and deciding how to apply them. One
scholar has written persuasively that any reliance the Court may be
placing on private nuisance law is erroneous.246 But, it is also errone-
ous to rely upon the common law of public nuisance to justify a state's
destruction of private property without compensation. As discussed
above, it is the right of public necessity, not the law of public nuisance
that permits uncompensated destruction of private property. 4"
242. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
243. See id at 1031. "We emphasize that to win its case [the State] must do more than
proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses [the owner] desires are Inconsistent with the
public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim ... ." Id
(citations omitted).
244. IM The principles of "nuisance law" to which Justice Scalia refers are principles of pri-
vate nuisance law and not public nuisance law.
245. Id at 1031-32.
246. See Halper, supra note 9, at 329.
247. See supra Part IA.2.b.
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Despite any confusion over the appropriate background principles to
apply to the analysis, it is clear that Lucas requires courts to examine
closely the regulatory conduct challenged because of the economic
losses it causes. While the Court has yet to apply the Lucas test di-
rectly, its subsequent examination of other land-use rules suggests a
level of scrutiny not unlike the one identified in Lucas.248 For exam-
ple, in the 1994 case of Dolan v. City of Tigard,2 49 the Court consid-
ered a property owner's challenge to a requirement that she dedicate a
portion of her land for flood control and other public use as a condi-
tion to obtaining a building permit. One after another, the Oregon
courts found the condition to be a reasonable one.250 Applying a two-
part test requiring the Court to go behind the articulated goals of local
officials, the Supreme Court reversed. First, it determined whether the
"'essential nexus' exists between the 'legitimate state interests' and the
permit condition exacted by the city."25  After finding such a nexus,
the Court engaged in the second part of the test in which it "must...
decide the required degree of connection between the exactions and the
projected impact of the proposed development." 52 In doing so, the
Court found that the city's articulation of a possible connection was
insufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements.253 Although the Court
rejected the property owner's argument that it should apply the test of
Lucas,"54 it remanded the case with instructions that the city "make
some effort to quantify its findings" beyond conclusory statements
about the possibility of the effect that the plaintiff's proposed develop-
ment would have on the area.255
The foregoing illustrates the increasing limits the Court has placed
on government's power to impose significant reductions in economic
and property rights without compensation. In contrast, Bennis v. Mich-
igan256 demonstrates how public nuisance law may adversely affect
those same rights with little interference from the Constitution.
248. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997) (finding escheat provisions of Indian
Land Consolidation Act amounted to unconstitutional taking); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994) (remanding landowner's challenge for determination of whether challenged govern-
ment action bore sufficient relationship to articulated goals).
249. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
250. See id at 382-83 (describing procedural background of case).
251. Id. at 386.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 396.
254. See id. at 385 n.6.
255. Id. at 395.
256. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
[Vol. 31:547
CROSSING THE THRESHOLD
IV. BENNIS V. MICHIGAN: MIXING APPLES AND ORANGES?
The police watch her house. She sees them often. Sometimes they
wave to let her know they're there. Her lawyers have found out that
the abatement order was signed by a judge several months ago. No
one had ever told her the police were going to board up her house
until a few days ago, when a man from the city came around. He said
it was because the former owner sold drugs from the house. That ex-
plains why people sometimes knock on her door looking to buy drugs.
She always tells them to go away. She doesn't understand why they
want her house: she doesn't use drugs and she doesn't sell them. She
hasn't done anything wrong.
A. The Facts
On October 3, 1988, Detroit police arrested John Bennis after ob-
serving him with a woman in a 1977 Pontiac parked on a Detroit
street." 7  Police charged Mr. Bennis with gross indecency. Before
criminal liability was established, county prosecutors commenced a
public nuisance action against John Bennis and his wife, Tina, as co-
owners of the car, seeking forfeiture of the car as abatement of a pub-
lic nuisance. Within a month of the arrest, but prior to the disposition
of the criminal charges, a trial on the public nuisance issue was held.
Tina Bennis testified at the nuisance trial; John Bennis did not. 9  In
an effort to defend against the abatement of her interest in the car,
Mrs. Bennis testified that she had neither any knowledge regarding her
husband's association with prostitutes, nor any knowledge regarding his
conduct or his whereabouts on the day of his arrest.2"o In a one-page,
unreported order, the trial court rejected her defense, "declared the car
a public nuisance, and ordered the car's abatement."' In addition,
after considering the age of the car and the amount paid for
257. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 US. 442 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
Several months after the abatement trial, Mr. Bennis pled guilty to a misdemeanor, was fined
$250, and required to perform community service. See ht at 7 & n.2.
258. Id. at 6. Nearly three months after the abatement trial, on January 27, 1989, John
Bennis pled guilty to a misdemeanor. He was fined $250 and ordered to perform community
service. See id at 7 & n2.
259. Although called to testify, John Bennis refused, asserting his Fifth Amendment right to
avoid self-incrimination. See Id at 7-9.
260. Id. at 7.
261. Bennts, 516 U.S. at 444.
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it-$600-the trial court rejected Mrs. Bennis's request to share in any
sale proceeds resulting from the forfeiture. It reasoned that "there's
practically nothing left minus costs in a situation such as this."262
1. The State Appeals
An intermediate appellate court reversed in Mrs. Bennis's favor on
two grounds.26 3  First, it held that under Michigan law, abatement of
Mrs. Bennis's interest in the jointly-owned car was improper because
the prosecution failed to establish that she had any knowledge regarding
her husband's conduct.2" The court of appeals also held that, under
Michigan law, "one isolated incident of prohibited conduct" by Mr.
Bennis was insufficient to establish that the Pontiac was a public nui-
sance under the statute.265
The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, reversed on both grounds,
and reinstated the trial court's abatement order.266 After applying prin-
ciples of statutory construction to determine the intent of the drafters of
recent amendments to the public nuisance statute as well as evidence
regarding other, similar incidents in the neighborhood where Bennis
was arrested, the court held that Bennis's single episode in the car was
sufficient to establish an abatable nuisance.267 In addition, it also held
that the state could constitutionally abate Mrs. Bennis's interest in the
car without proof that she had knowledge regarding his conduct.268
Mrs. Bennis appealed to the United States Supreme Court for a
determination of whether Michigan's public nuisance abatement scheme
262. Id. at 445 (quoting trial court's order).
263. State v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich.
1994), affd, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
264. Id. at 733. The court of appeals held that recent Michigan Supreme Court authority
supported reliance on People v. Schoonmaker, 216 N.W. 456 (Mich. 1927), a Michigan Su-
preme Court case that held that proof of defendant's knowledge was required despite a statutory
provision that "proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defen-
dant . . . is not required." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3815(2) (1997).
265. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 734. With respect to this second point, the court of appeals re-
lied upon State v. Motoroma Motel Corp., 307 N.W.2d 349 (Mich. CL App. 1981), which had
held that a nuisance "should not be based upon proof of a single isolated incident unless the
facts surrounding that incident permit the reasonable inference that the prohibited conduct was
habitual in nature." Id. at 352.
266. Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994), affd, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S.
442 (1996). The Michigan Supreme Court, noting a conflict between its own decisions regard-
ing proof of knowledge and the plaln language of the statute, overruled Schoonmaker and held
that the statutory provision not requiring proof of knowledge controlled.
267. Id. at 489.
268. Id. at 494 & n.32 (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827)).
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deprived her of her interest in the car without due process of law and
effected a taking of her property for public use without compensa-
tion.269 Although she did not contest the state's ability constitutionally
to declare the car an abatable public nuisance, she urged the Court to
apply a traditional takings analysis to determine the application of the
provision to her interest in the car.27 She argued that because of her
lack of culpability, the failure to compensate her for the confiscation of
her interest in the car amounted to a deprivation of property without
due process and a taking of her property without just compensation271
Accordingly, Mrs. Bennis argued, the burden was the state's, not Mrs.
Bennis's to establish an exception to the requirement that it pay just
compensation for the property taken.2" The analysis she proposed was
the one the Court set out just four terms earlier in Lucas, which would
have placed the burden upon the state to demonstrate that the result of
its action on Mrs. Bennis's property-i.e., deprivation of all economic
value--"substantially advance[d] legitimate state interests." 3
2. The Decision
Rather than analyzing the case under the contemporary takings
analysis that Mrs. Bennis urged, the Court reached back, past public
nuisance law, to principles of nineteenth century admiralty law and af-
firmed. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for a divided Court,' 4
holding that despite Mrs. Bennis's lack of culpability in her husband's
offense, forfeiture of her interests in the car was a legitimate exercise
of the state's police power and that the seizure operated neither as a
taking nor as a deprivation of her property without due process.27
As a result, Bennis v. Michigan resembles Mugler v. Kansas, the
leading public nuisance case prior to Lucas. As explained above, under
Mugler, the due process analysis consisted only of determining whether
269. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 444-46.
270. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
271. Id. at 14; United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Bennis v. Michigan, 1995
WL 712350 (Nov. 29, 1995) (No. 94-8729).
272. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 27-30, Bennis v. Michigan, 1995 WL
712350 (Nov. 29, 1995) (No. 94-8729).
273. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
274. Although Justices Thomas and Ginsburg joined Justices Scalia and O'Connor in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, they each filed separate concurrences. See 516 U.S. at 453 (Thomas, J,
concurring); id. at 457 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Stevens dissented in an opinion
joined by Justices Souter and Breyer. See i at 458 (Stevens, I., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
filed a separate dissent. See id at 472 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
275. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 451-52.
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the government's conduct amounted to a legitimate exercise of the
police power. 76  Under Lucas, however, where regulation causes a total
diminution in the value of real property, conclusions about "the legisla-
ture's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for
departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be
compensated '27 7 and must yield to a "contemporary understanding of
the broad realm within which government may regulate 2 7  individual
and property rights. Yet, as in Mugler, the Bennis Court assumes the
legitimacy of Michigan's public nuisance provision and avoids analysis
of the range of property and individual interests affected by the state's
action. In addition, by collapsing the law of public nuisance into the
law of civil forfeiture, the Court justifies the state's actions by resur-
recting notions of "guilty property" that have no basis in the law of
public nuisance. 9
Instead, Justice Rehnquist relies on a "long and unbroken line of
cases hold[ing] that an owner's interest in property may be forfeited by
reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner
did not know that it was to be put to such use."28  He begins with
The Palmyra,"' an 1827 case involving the seizure of a Spanish ship
by an American gunboat. But The Palmyra was not a public nuisance
case, and no forfeiture occurred in it. 82
276. See supra Part I.B.
277. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
278. Id. at 1024.
279. See supra Part I.D.
280. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 446.
281. 25 U.S. I (1827).
282. After the ship was seized under a federal anti-piracy statute, a trial court entered an
order that "the brig be acquitted," and returned it to its owner. Despite finding for the owner
on the merits of the case, the court rejected the owner's claim for damages suffered during the
time the ship was held prior to trial. Both sides appealed to the circuit court which affirmed
the acquittal, but reversed on the issue of damages and awarded more than $10,000 to the
owners. Id. at 6-9.
The government appealed. In 1825, the Supreme Court originally dismissed the appeal for
procedural irregularities, but later reinstated. Once again both sides appealed. Upon review,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that forfeiture historically served as punishment upon convic-
tion of a felony, but described forfeiture in that context as arising out of the court's power in
an in personam action. Such a forfeiture was distinct from what occurred in an admiralty or
other in rem proceeding, where the status of property-not the owner-was on trial. The
Palmyra Court considered this history to be a preliminary matter and on the facts of the case
was divided on the primary issue of whether condemnation was appropriate. Although the
Court found sufficient evidence to sustain the validity of the seizure, reversing the award of
damages to the owner, it affirmed the judgment of acquittal resulting in the permanent return
of the vessel to the owner. Thus, on its facts, The Palmyra stands for the proposition that
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Nevertheless, The Palmyra served as the basis for the guilty proper-
ty fiction which, as described in Part I above, served to confer jurisdic-
tion on the courts, relieving them from the obligation of finding the
owner, much less inquiring into any level of culpability.s As the
guilty property fiction relieved courts from that obligation, it also re-
lieved them from any obligation to inquire into the degree of economic
loss the forfeiture caused.2" It was the presence of the property, not
its economic value that mattered in a forfeiture proceeding.'ss Indeed,
there is some support for the theory that the greater the property's
value-and, consequently, the owner's loss-the more the forfeiture
served its purpose of securing a fund from which claims could be
paid.286
The Court also ignores Tina Bennis's innocence and the equitable
underpinnings of public nuisance law.2"7 Even its description of Tina
Bennis's interest in the car is consistent with that approach as it de-
scribes the property involved only parenthetically, as: "(an 11-year-old
Pontiac sedan recently purchased by John and Tina Bennis for
$600).'2"s8 That interest was further minimized by the trial court's re-
fusal to order a division of the proceeds remaining after the sale of the
car, on the ground that "there's practically nothing left minus costs in a
situation such as this."8 9 The value of her modest car and her result-
ing loss is inconsequential in the face of the government's ability to
abate the nuisance.
while a prior conviction may not be necessary for a seizure, it may be necessary for the ulti-
mate forfeiture of property. See i'i at 12-13.
283. Of course, any continuing vitality of the guilty property fiction as a basis for in rem
jurisdiction must be suspect. See generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (requiring
"the standard of fairness and substantial justice" articulated in International Shoe v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) to apply to the exercise of in rem jurisdiction).
284. See supra Part I.D.
285. In contrast, the value of property seized may be highly relevant in a criminal forfeiture
when it serves as punishment for a criminal offense and thus falls within the scope of
protections offered by the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See United States
v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct 2028 (1998) (finding that criminal forfeiture of S357,144 for violating
statute requiring a person to report the transportation of more than $10,000 outside of the Unit-
ed States, amounted to violation of Excessive Fines Clause).
286. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 663, 679-80 (1974).
287. Although Justice Ginsburg nods to the equitable nature of the abatement proceeding and
the role of the trial judge in such a proceeding, the other members of the majority essentially
ignore the historical, equitable nature of the abatement remedy. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 457-
58 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).




This analysis also ignores Lucas, which considers the degree of
economic loss the owner suffers to be highly relevant to the analysis.
Indeed, in circumstances where the owner suffers a total deprivation of
property value, Lucas will not permit the government to avoid paying
compensation by resting on the justification that the action is necessary
to prevent a harm.29° Thus, under Lucas, the degree of the owner's
loss limits the government's ability to regulate the use without compen-
sation. As Justice Thomas notes in his concurring opinion, such limits
may be "especially significant when they are the sole restrictions on the
state's ability to take property from those it merely suspects, or does
not even suspect, of colluding in crime."29  Because value is irrelevant
to the guilty property fiction, the Court undertakes no such examination
suggesting an absence of any meaningful limits on government con-
duct.
292
Also, the Court does not engage in any significant level of analysis
with respect to other individual interests affected by the state's action.
It simply accepts the legitimacy of Michigan's decision to "deter johns
from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood
blight."'2 93 It does not inquire further, either into less intrusive means
of achieving its goals, such as revoking John Bennis's driver's license,
or into the effects, if any, the forfeiture may have on others. This is
ironic given the manner in which forfeiture law traditionally took into
account the innocent owner's ability to mitigate losses by attempting to
seek recovery from the wrongdoer. Indeed, in each of the cases relied
upon by Justice Rehnquist, a relationship existed that, arguably, provid-
ed the innocent owner with a basis for indemnification.294 Such a rela-
290. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
291. Id at 458 (Thomas, J., concurring).
292. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621-27 (discussing the relevance of property value in the con-
text of an Eighth Amendment excessive fines challenge); City of Milwaukee v. Arrich, 565
N.W.2d 291, 294 (Wis. CL App. 1997) (citing Bennis as standing for the proposition that while
abatement of any nuisance adversely affects the owner of the property found to be subject to
abatement, that situation has never been considered punishment subject to an excessive fines
analysis).
293. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 458 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
294. See, e.g., Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878) (owner of the for-
feited property leased property to lessee who was convicted of wrongful conduct); Calero-Tole-
do, 418 U.S. at 677-78 & n.12 (discussing respective contractual rights of owner and lessor at
time of seizure); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926) (describing seller's use of the car
as "part consideration" for its sale, suggesting a contractual basis for the owner to seek relief
from the wrongdoer); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (relevant relationship was
between owner and captain of ship seized).
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tionship does not exist in Tina Bennis's case. Her ownership rights do
not arise out of a commercial relationship with the wrongdoer. They
arise from her status as the wrongdoer's spouse, a relationship in which
indemnification does not generally play a part and a fact that the Court
fails to consider.
4. The Dissenting Opinions: Pragmatism and Analysis
The forfeiture rules applied by the majority developed as practical
solutions for the realities of pre-industrial ocean travel and maritime
commerce. 29s Yet, as Justice Kennedy notes in his dissenting opinion,
the majority ignores the contemporary "practical necessity"2z of Ameri-
can dependence on the automobile and the comprehensive systems for
registering cars and licensing drivers that enable law enforcement offi-
cials to quickly and accurately reach persons whose property is suspect-
ed of misuse.
Paradoxically, the task of engaging in a meaningful analysis of the
law and the facts at hand is left to Justices Stevens and Kennedy
whose dissenting opinions more closely resemble the Court's modem
precedent of Lucas than the majority's. Recognizing, as Lucas cau-
tions, that a legislature's simple articulation of legitimate goals does not
satisfy the Due Process Clause, the authors of both dissenting opinions
do more than simply rely on the language of the statute or similar
cases. Both Justices Kennedy and Stevens engage in a thoughtful anal-
ysis, not only of the nature of the property rights involved, but also of
the range of interests that are affected. As discussed above, Justice
Kennedy takes a pragmatic approach, recognizing that equitable results
can be achieved without upsetting the long line of forfeiture cases upon
which the majority relies.297
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, tackles the
majority head on.29 Although he accepts the majority's reliance on
forfeiture law rather than the law of public nuisance, he considers the
property to be more than a parenthetical. Justice Stevens begins with
an examination of the nature of the property involved to determine
first, what relationship, if any, the property bears to the offense and
secondly, whether forfeiture in the particular case would be fair. Thus,
Justice Stevens considers evidence that John Bennis was sighted in the
295. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 472 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
296. Itt at 473.
297. Id
298. Id at 458-72.
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neighborhood soliciting prostitutes without the car on at least one previ-
ous occasion as well as a lack of evidence that Mr. Bennis had previ-
ously used the car for a similar purpose. Further, he considered the
car irrelevant to the criminal conduct because although the crime oc-
curred in the car, the car was considered an abatable nuisance only so
long as it remained in the area.2 99 In the end, he finds only a "tenuous
connection between the property forfeited here and the illegal act"
which cannot, consistent with constitutional principles of due process,
support the state's action."'
The dissenting opinions make it clear that application of a contem-
porary due process analysis to the facts produces a markedly different
result. Although Michigan v. Bennis involved a car and not a home,
its application is not limited to the abatement of personal property.
The next section considers how the expansive view of state power that
Bennis embraces extends to the abatement of public nuisance activity
conducted within one's home.
C. Public Nuisance Conduct Within the Home
Two recent cases illustrate Bennis's reach. The first is State v.
Anthony,3 0 ' which, although decided prior to the Court's decision in
Bennis, resembles it as it analyzes a trial court order padlocking a
home for one year. In Anthony, the owner had pled guilty to felony
drug trafficking offenses and was on probation when police officers
investigated complaints that the drug traffic continued from his home.
The police obtained and executed a search warrant and found approxi-
mately one-half pound of marijuana, several guns, and cash. Despite
the seizure, within a few days after the search, neighbors reported traf-
fic had resumed outside Anthony's home.
Attorneys for Franklin County and the City of Columbus com-
menced a public nuisance action seeking preliminary and permanent
injunctions abating the nuisance. After ordering a preliminary injunc-
tion, the court also granted the city's request for permanent relief and,
in accordance with the statute, ordered "the premises padlocked for one
299. Id. at 465.
300. Id. at 459. Compare with Lucas, 506 U.S. at 1031 (requiring balancing of the degree
of harm the claimant's conduct would have on others with the social value of claimant's con-
duct).
301. 647 N.E.2d 1368 (Ohio 1995).
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year and taxed Anthony $300.00." '32 An intermediate appellate court
reversed, holding that a jury trial was required under the state constitu-
tion and that the state failed to meet its burden under the statute of
proving that a nuisance occurred at the time the complaint was filed,
much less at the time the hearing occurred.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed on both grounds. First, the
court described the statutory remedy of padlocking the home for any
use an equitable one that constituted an legitimate exercise of the police
power under the Ohio Constitution. In language that once again echoes
Mugler, the Court wrote:
All property owners are obligated to use their property in a
manner that will not injure the community at large. . . . The
legislature may exercise its police power by authorizing the
proper authorities to grant injunctions in order to prevent cer-
tain persons from allowing their property to pose a continuing
detriment to public safety. 3
Since the action was an equitable one, not a legal or criminal proceed-
ing, the court determined that no jury was required.3 ' It then turned
to the issue of whether the nuisance conduct must be occurring at the
time the complaint was filed or at the time of the hearing and conclud-
ed that there "need not be evidence that [nuisance activities] are occur-
ring either at the time a complaint is filed or at the time a hearing
takes place in order for a nuisance subject to abatement to exist."305
Thus, although Anthony was not an innocent owner, the Ohio Supreme
Court held that evidence of present nuisance activity was not necessary
to the determination of whether the injunctive relief was necessary.3 6
When read with Bennis, the case demonstrates that the existence of past
nuisance conduct may subject the property to abatement despite the
innocence of the owner or the cessation of the conduct.
A recent Wisconsin case decided after Bennis makes a similar
point. In City of Milwaukee v. Arrieh,07 officials from the City of
Milwaukee commenced an action under Wisconsin's Drug Abatement
302. Id at 1370 (quoting Court's syllabus).




307. 565 N.W.2d 291 (,Vis. Ct. App.), review denied, 569 NW.2d 589, and cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 885 (1997).
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Law. 8 to close and sell an apartment building owned by Brahim Arrieh
in which he also resided. Under the statute, innocence was not a de-
fense and there was no allegation that Arrieh himself participated in
any drug-related activity. Based on evidence that one of Arrieh's ten-
ants was engaged in prohibited activity, the trial court found that the
building constituted a nuisance and ordered that the building-valued at
$136,600-be closed and sold. On appeal, Arrieh argued that the
court's order deprived him of his property without due process of
law." 9 Although the court rejected his arguments, it nevertheless re-
manded the case for consideration of whether the closure and sale
amounted to an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment.1
After the case returned to the trial court, the judge held that the closure
and sale of the apartment building constituted an excessive fine and
therefore violated Arrieh's Eighth Amendment rights.31' Before the
Court's decision was final, Bennis intervened and the city appealed.
Unfortunately for Arrieh, the court read Bennis broadly and
stretched its reasoning to the Eighth Amendment argument before it.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasoned because Bennis permitted
public nuisance abatement despite an owner's innocence, abatement
cannot amount to punishment for an offense. Since no punishment was
involved, it reasoned, the Eighth Amendment did not apply. Accord-
ingly, the court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the closure order
and reinstated, paving the way for the sale to proceed without any
consideration of the nature of the property involved.
Although some courts have reached different results, they are in the
minority."t 2 The majority view suggests that, however broad a state's
power to abate a public nuisance may have been prior to Bennis v.
Michigan, it can now be regarded as broader. This development is
particularly troublesome when the state moves to abate a nuisance with-
308. Wis. STAT. § 823.113 (1997).
309. City of Milwaukee v. Arrieh, No. 91-2628, 1994 WL 525931, at *5 (Vis. Ct. App.
Sept. 27, 1994) (unpublished opinion), appeal after remand, 565 N.W.2d 291, review denied,
569 N.W.2d 589, and cert. denied, 118 S. CL 885 (1997).
310. Id.
311. See Arrieh, 565 N.W.2d at 291.
312. See, e.g., City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen, 675 So. 2d 626, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that municipal order closing apartment complex for one year as a statutory
nuisance, in an attempt to curtail the tenant's narcotics use, qualified as a compensable taking
under the Fifth Amendment); Spenard Action Comm. v. Evergreen Subdiv., 902 P.2d 766, 773
(Alaska 1995) (holding that a court should have the discretion to refuse to issue an Injunction




in a person's home.
V. PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW SHOULD RECOGNIZE
THE TRADITIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE HOME
AS WELL AS THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS EMBODIED WITH IT
At the hearing, the police admit that the mother isn't selling drugs.
They only want to enforce the judgment they obtained against the prior
owner. When asked why the police still want to close up the house(
the city attorney replies, "We've got a judgment, Your Honor." The
judge looks at the statute and then at the lavyer. He knows the lam,-
yer is right, the statute requires that a judgment contain an order to
board up the house. But, the mother's lawyers argue, "She's not sell-
ing drugs, she's got three children, she sends the druggies mvay."
They know the judge doesn't want to put the mother and her three
children on the street. He said so. He also said he doesn't want any
drugs to be sold from the house. He looks at the city's lmvyer, then at
the mother's lawyers. "Can't you all go and settle this?" he asks.
Public nuisance law fails to recognize that a broad range of public
policies regularly give way to the individual rights related to the home.
Rules developed under the Fourth Amendment shield the home from
government intrusion in the exercise of legitimate law enforcement
activities. The Fourteenth Amendment protects individual, personal
decisions related to family life and provides them with heightened pro-
tection from state regulation. Nevertheless, Bennis and Anthony suggest
that a home may be seized despite the owner's innocence or even evi-
dence that nuisance conduct is occurring at the time of the seizure.
Bennis also disregards the private nature of those decisions by making
no concessions for innocent family members who must suffer the con-
sequences of others' wrongdoing.
Public nuisance law, as interpreted by Bennis, also has failed to
keep pace with recent developments in property law. Although public
nuisance law historically formed the basis of much of the Court's lav
of takings under the Fifth Amendment, the Court's re-examination of
that precedent has found it to be an unsatisfactory limit on
governments' ability to regulate private property. Yet, Bennis demon-
strates that public nuisance law remains stagnant. Thus, despite
Lucas's refusal to justify dramatic reductions in property values caused
by government regulation on the basis that the regulation prevents pub-
lic harms, cases like Arrieh allow seizure of valuable property on the
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same authority that Lucas rejects.
Courts and lawmakers must recognize that the abatement of a pub-
lic nuisance within a person's home involves more than the
government's interest in protecting health, safety, and welfare. It also
involves the range of individual and property rights examined in this
Article. One scholar has called upon Congress to take these issues
into account in the context of federal drug forfeiture laws and enact
exemptions to protect innocent family members from the loss of proper-
ty.3" 3 Similarly, state legislators should begin with a threshold apprecia-
tion of the limits the Constitution places on government interferences
with individual and property interests in one's home. Isolated examples
of carefully drafted public nuisance statutes that require courts to take
into account such factors do exist.3" 4 They can serve as models for
other states by expressly exempting family homes from nuisance abate-
mene "5 or by requiring courts to consider the availability of alternative
housing or relocation assistance before ordering the closure of a home
in connection with abatement of a public nuisance." 6 However, even
widespread legislative reform is not likely to resolve inequities arising
from abatement of a public nuisance.
The law of public nuisance has a rich history within the courts and
it is there that meaningful reform must begin. Closure of a home or
its seizure should be approached reluctantly, with the same degree of
hesitation courts historically displayed to requests for abatement where
criminal liability could also be established. Courts should not substitute
the nuisance label for rigorous analysis when asked to close or seize a
home. Instead they must ask whether the contemplated action fairly
313. See Guerra, supra note 6, at 90.
314. For example, in Arkansas, courts shall "provide for any appropriate equitable relief" nec-
essary to abate a public nuisance and may order a building's closure only upon a determination
that it is the "least restrictive alternative available to effectively accomplish" the abatement.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-105412(b) (Michie Supp. 1997). Moreover, upon a finding that a build-
ing's closure would be harmful to the community, an Arkansas court may order the person re-
sponsible for nuisance to pay damages to be used for drug prevention and education programs.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-105-412(c)(1) (Michie Supp. 1997).
315. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11573.5 (West 1998) (requiring courts to consid-
er, among other things, the effect closure may have on persons not involved in the nuisance
and permitting courts to require agency seeking closure to pay for relocation assistance for
persons displaced by closure).
316. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 823.113(d) (1997):
The effect of granting the request upon any resident or occupant of the premises
who is not named in the action, including the availability of alternative housing or
relocation assistance, the pendency of any action to evict a resident or occupant and
any evidence of participation by a resident or occupant in the nuisance activity.
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accomplishes legislative goals. In connection with this inquiry courts
should consider several factors: 1) the degree of harm that ongoing
public nuisance conduct may cause to the public and to other occupants
of the home; 2) the effects abatement may have on persons other than
the wrongdoer; 3) the availability of alternative, affordable housing
opportunities for all persons occupying the home; and 4) the economic
loss seizure or closure will likely have on persons currently occupying
the home. While these factors are not exclusive, they should provide a
meaningful framework upon which courts may build their analysis.
For example, when considering the first factor, a court should con-
sider whether the nuisance conduct is ongoing and whether the wrong-
doer continues to occupy the premises. In cases where the wrongdoer
is absent, a court might reasonably conclude that the home no longer
poses a threat to the public and, therefore, the state's action in closing
the home no longer bears a sufficient nexus to any ongoing conduct.
Consideration of the second factor will require courts to inquire
into whether persons other than the wrongdoer may be affected by an
order closing or seizing a home. It will also require courts to consider
the nature of relationship between such people and the wrongdoer. For
example, does the order result in the displacement of innocent children
or a spouse? What about other persons not related to the wrongdoer?
Are they tenants? Does displacement of such persons result in unwant-
ed interruptions in school or employment or interfere with access to
public services or religious or cultural institutions?
The third and fourth factors are related and should be considered
together as they require consideration of alternative housing opportuni-
ties and the economic means necessary to obtain them. Courts must
take into account the significant adverse economic consequences that
may result from abatement. Adverse economic consequences resulting
from the total deprivation of a seizure are self-evident. Yet, there may
be numerous other costs associated with dispossession and relocation.
At the same time the property owner will be forced to pay for alterna-
tive housing, many statutes contemplate that the owner will be responsi-
ble for maintenance and repairs during the period the property is to be
padlocked. Prevented from residing in the locked home, the owner
may nevertheless be required to keep the premises in good repair, pay
taxes, and prevent trespassers. Such costs may be in addition to the
direct and consequential costs associated with securing alternative hous-
ing such as application fees, security deposits, moving costs, storage
fees, and deposits, in addition to the costs for the alternative housing
itself. Because few homeowners can afford to maintain an unoccupied
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property for any length of time and also bear the immediate costs asso-
ciated with alternative housing, even a temporary closure may result in
the permanent loss of a home, placing additional burdens on those least
able to afford them.
CONCLUSION
Public nuisance law, historically, has provided public officials with
tools to reach conduct not easily addressed by other areas of the law.
It has provided equitable remedies for practical problems where the
criminal and legal systems have failed. However, as courts and law-
makers continue to use public nuisance law to fill in those gaps, they
must not ignore the practical effects its remedies may bring about,
especially when addressing nuisance conduct within one's home.
